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Abstract	
We	report	the	results	of	a	laboratory	experiment	based	on	a	citizen‐candidate	model	with	private	
information	about	ideal	points.	Inefficient	political	polarization	is	observed	in	all	treatments;	that	
is,	 citizens	with	 extreme	 ideal	 points	 enter	 as	 candidates	more	 often	 than	moderate	 citizens.	
Second,	 less	 entry	 occurs,	 with	 even	 greater	 polarization,	 when	 voters	 have	 directional	
information	 about	 candidates’	 ideal	 points,	 using	 ideological	 party	 labels.	 Nonetheless,	 this	
directional	information	is	welfare	enhancing	because	the	inefficiency	from	greater	polarization	
is	 outweighed	by	 lower	 total	 entry	 costs	 and	better	 voter	 information.	 Third,	 entry	 rates	 are	
decreasing	in	group	size	and	the	entry	cost.	These	findings	are	all	implied	by	properties	of	the	
unique	symmetric	Bayesian	equilibrium	of	the	entry	game.	Quantitatively,	we	observe	too	little	
(too	 much)	 entry	 when	 the	 theoretical	 entry	 rates	 are	 high	 (low).	 This	 general	 pattern	 of	
observed	biases	in	entry	rates	is	implied	by	logit	quantal	response	equilibrium.	
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1.	Introduction	
Who	runs	for	office?	How	many	candidates	can	we	expect	to	compete	in	a	winner‐take‐all	election?	
Are	those	who	run	for	political	office	representative	of	the	views	of	the	general	polity?	How	might	
entry	depend	upon	the	role	of	political	organizations,	such	as	parties,	in	the	selection	of	candidates?	
Here,	we	 examine	 these	 and	 related	 questions	 in	 a	 laboratory	 experiment	 by	 testing	 predictions	
derived	from	a	citizen‐candidate	entry	game	and	comparing	entry	behavior	across	several	different	
environments.	 The	 citizen	 candidate	 model,	 which	 originates	 in	 Besley	 and	 Coate	 (1997)	 and	
Osborne	and	Slivinski	(1996),	departs	from	the	canonical	spatial	model	of	electoral	competition	with	
exogenous	politicians	(Downs	1957;	Hotelling	1929)	in	two	important	ways.1	First,	the	candidates	
are	citizens	with	policy	preferences	(as	in	Wittman	1983)	who	vote	in	the	election	and,	once	elected,	
implement	their	own	taste	as	the	common	policy.	Second,	the	voting	stage	is	preceded	by	an	entry	
stage	where	each	citizen	decides	whether	 to	 throw	her	hat	 in	 the	ring.	Thus,	a	citizen’s	objective	
function	not	just	takes	into	account	the	benefits	of	holding	office	(“spoils	of	office”)	as	in	the	canonical	
model,	but	is	also	includes	the	cost	of	candidacy	and	the	indirect	benefit	of	reducing	the	possibility	
of	 less	 desired	 policies	 that	 would	 be	 implemented	 by	 other	 potential	 candidates.	 Because	 the	
citizens	 themselves	 decide	 on	 whether	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 both	 the	 number	 and	 the	 ideological	
composition	 of	 entering	 candidates	 are	 modeled	 as	 equilibrium	 outcomes.	 Crucially,	 their	 entry	
decisions	 are	asymmetric	 since	 citizens	with	 different	 policy	 preferences	will	 anticipate	 different	
benefits	 from	 policy	 implementation.	 Coordination	 problems	 are	 also	 present	 due	 to	 nontrivial	
strategic	uncertainties.	
In	the	standard	citizen	candidate	model,	all	citizens	are	endowed	with	complete	information	
about	 the	exact	 location	of	 all	others’	 ideal	points,	 and	hence	can	 infer	 the	exact	 location	of	each	
entering	 candidate.	 However,	 many	 empirical	 studies	 indicate	 that	 citizens	 tend	 to	 have	 limited	
knowledge	about	the	candidates’	exact	stances	on	policy	issues	(e.g.,	Campbell	et	al.	1960;	Palfrey	
and	 Poole	 1987).	We	 can	 think	 of	 various	 reasons	 why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 For	 example,	 time	 and	
willpower	 is	 scarce	 so	 that	 many	 citizens	 simply	 cannot	 be	 as	 well	 informed	 about	 the	 policy	
intentions	of	candidates	as,	say,	special	interest	groups.	Or,	politicians	often	remain	quiet	about	their	
true	intentions	during	campaigns	due	to	strategic	incentives	and	it	is	almost	impossible	for	citizens	
to	discover	these	tastes,	even	if	they	are	willing	to	exert	effort.	More	realistically,	citizens	have	only	
                                                            
1	The	citizen	candidate	approach	has	its	roots	in	work	on	policy‐motivated	candidates	(e.g.,	Wittman	1983),	strategic	entry	
(e.g.,	Feddersen,	Sened,	and	Wright	1990;	Palfrey	1984),	and	Duverger’s	law	(e.g.,	Feddersen	1992;	Palfrey	1989).	For	a	
survey	of	citizen	candidate	models,	see	Bol,	Dellis,	and	Oak	(2015).	
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incomplete	information	about	the	location	of	the	entering	candidates,	and	this	leads	us	to	adopt	a	
Bayesian	game	formulation	of	the	entry	game.	
The	experiment	is	based	on	a	laboratory	implementation	of	the	following	citizen‐candidate	
entry	game	with	incomplete	information	(Großer	and	Palfrey	2014).	An	electorate	consisting	of	݊	
citizens	 is	electing	a	 leader	 to	 implement	a	policy	outcome	by	plurality	voting.	Each	citizen	has	a	
privately	known	ideal	point	in	a	one	dimensional	policy	space.	These	ideal	points	are	iid	draws	from	
a	commonly	known,	uniform	distribution	over	 the	policy	space.	A	citizen’s	utility	 from	the	policy	
outcome	declines	linearly	in	the	absolute	distance	from	her	ideal	point.	The	game	has	two	decision‐
making	stages.	In	the	first	stage	(Entry),	citizens	decide	independently	and	simultaneously	whether	
and	 pay	 a	 cost	ܿ ൐ 0	to	become	a	candidate	in	the	election,	 or	 not	 enter	 and	 bear	 no	 cost.	 In	 the	
second	stage	(Voting),	each	citizen	casts	a	vote	for	exactly	one	of	the	candidates.	In	the	baseline	model	
citizens	must	vote	without	any	additional	information	about	the	candidates’	ideal	points	(of	course,	
the	contenders	know	their	own	ideal	point).	The	candidate	with	the	most	votes	becomes	the	leader	
and	receives	a	bonus	ܾ ൐ 0	(i.e.,	the	spoils	of	office)	and	her	ideal	point	is	automatically	implemented	
as	the	common	policy.	Ties	are	broken	randomly.	Finally,	if	nobody	enters,	then	a	leader	is	randomly	
selected	from	all	the	citizens	and	her	ideal	point	is	implemented	as	the	common	policy.	
Because	 symmetric	 BNE	 in	 cutpoint	 strategies	 is	 unique,	 potentially	 difficult	 issues	 of	
equilibrium	selection	are	avoided.	By	contrast,	citizen	candidate	models	with	complete	information	
about	candidate	ideal	points	(e.g.,	Besley	and	Coate	1997;	Osborne	and	Slivinski	1996)	usually	have	
multiple	equilibria,	and	therefore	are	more	complicated	to	evaluate	empirically	even	in	the	 lab.	A	
second	 advantage	 of	 the	 incomplete	 information	 approach	 is	 that	 distributional	 predictions	 are	
qualitative	predictions	about	polarization	and	the	number	of	entrants	is	more	robust	to	a	wide	range	
of	 environmental	 parameters	 one	 expects	 to	 encounter	 in	 the	 field.	 In	 fact,	 existing	 empirical	
evidence	strongly	suggests	that	policy	preferences	of	politicians	are	more	polarized	than	the	citizens	
they	represent	(e.g.,	Bafumi	and	Herron	2010;	DiMaggio,	Evans,	and	Bryson	1996;	Fiorina,	Abrams,	
and	Pope	2006;	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2006).	Beyond	this	empirical	support,	our	approach	
offers	a	theoretical	foundation	for	possible	mechanisms	that	can	lead	to	political	polarization.	The	
experiment	provides	additional	evidence	by	generating	data	on	entry	behavior	in	carefully	controlled	
environments,	in	order	to	assess	the	plausibility	of	these	theoretical	mechanisms.	
This	 citizen‐candidate	 entry	 game	 with	 incomplete	 information	 yields	 sharp	 predictions	
about	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 entrants’	 ideal	 points	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 entry.	 The	 key	 property	 of	
equilibrium	 is	political	polarization	 in	 the	sense	 that	 candidate	entry	 is	 from	the	extremes	of	 the	
policy	 space,	 contrary	 to	 usual	 centrist	 predictions	 of	 most	 models	 of	 political	 competition.	
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Specifically,	 the	 unique	 symmetric	 Bayesian	 Nash	 equilibrium	 (BNE)	 in	 the	 baseline	 entry	 game	
consists	of	a	left	and	right	cutpoint,	ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ,	where	each	citizen	with	an	ideal	point	at	either	cutpoint	
or	to	the	left	of	ුݔ௟	or	to	the	right	of	ුݔ௥	enters	the	political	competition,	while	every	citizen	with	an	
ideal	point	between	the	two	cutpoints	doesn’t	enter.2	Based	on	this	equilibrium,	one	can	also	compute	
expected	economic	welfare	and	its	various	components,	and	derive	comparative	statics	predictions	
of	 interest	 such	 as	 the	 effects	 of	 electorate	 size,	 entry	 costs,	 benefits	 of	 holding	 office,	 and	 the	
distribution	of	ideal	points	on	entry	decisions	and	welfare.		
The	 intuition	 for	 why	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 citizen	 and	 candidate	 ideal	 points	
creates	political	polarization	can	be	explained	by	a	simple	example.	Suppose,	for	example,	the	policy	
space	is	ሾെ1,1ሿ	and	there	are	three	entrants	with	ideal	points	at	െ1,	0,	and	1,	respectively.	Then,	each	
candidate	has	a	one‐third	chance	of	winning	 the	election	(i.e.,	 they	each	vote	 for	 themselves	and,	
because	ideal	points	are	private	information,	each	non‐candidate	votes	randomly	for	one	of	them).	
With	identical	entry	costs	and	office‐holding	benefits,	they	only	differ	in	their	expected	policy	losses	
if	 a	 rival	 candidate	 happens	 to	win.	 In	 our	 example,	 for	 each	 of	 the	 two	 extreme	 candidates	 the	
expected	loss	equals	1,	while	the	expected	loss	is	only	2/3	for	the	moderate	candidate.	This	illustrates	
what	turns	out	to	be	a	general	property	of	the	model:	extreme	citizens	have	a	stronger	incentive	to	
enter	the	political	competition	than	moderate	citizens,	and	is	the	basis	for	the	emergence	of	political	
polarization	in	the	model.	This	result	holds	more	generally	for	any	smooth	probability	distribution	
of	ideal	points	(Großer	and	Palfrey	2014)	and	weakly	concave	preferences	of	voters.	Importantly,	
polarization	is	welfare	reducing	since	ex	ante	the	expected	total	policy	loss	is	minimized	when	the	
common	policy	is	a	centrist	ideal	point.	
While	incomplete	information	is	surely	an	important	consideration	in	elections,	the	model	
described	 above	 explores	 a	 polar	 case	 where	 citizens	 are	 completely	 uninformed	 about	 the	
candidates’	ideal	points,	except	for	the	inference	they	can	make	from	equilibrium	strategies,	to	wit,	
that	entry	comes	from	the	extremes.	It	is	interesting	to	explore	an	intermediate	case	of	incomplete	
information	 that	 also	 corresponds	 to	 the	 widely	 observed	 phenomenon	 that	 ideologically‐based	
parties	act	as	gatekeepers	in	the	candidate	entry	stage.	As	a	result	most	citizens	are	aware	of	the	
party	affiliations	of	candidates,	which	are	for	example	communicated	via	nominating	conventions,	
and	since	parties	are	ideological	they	can	use	this	crucial	piece	of	information	as	a	credible	cue	about	
a	 candidate’s	 ideal	point,	 for	 their	voting	decision	 (e.g.,	Ansolabehere,	Rodden,	 and	Snyder	2008;	
Snyder	and	Ting	2002).	
                                                            
2	In	the	Voting	stage,	each	candidate	optimally	votes	for	herself	and	each	non‐candidate	optimally	votes	randomly	for	a	
candidate.	The	expected	policy	outcome	does	not	change	if	abstention	is	allowed.	
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To	account	for	relevant	party	cues,	we	extend	the	basic	citizen‐candidate	entry	game	where	
a	 left	and	a	right	party	each	nominates	a	candidate	 from	the	pool	of	entrants	on	their	side	of	 the	
political	spectrum,	and	citizens	are	informed	about	each	nominee’s	party	affiliation.	This	provides	
some	 useful	 voting	 information,	 although	 the	 exact	 ideal	 points	 of	 the	 party	 nominees	 are	 not	
revealed.	This	“directional	information”	has	two	important	effects.	First,	it	leads	to	fewer	and	even	
more	polarized	entrants	than	in	the	absence	of	parties.	This	is	because	a	citizen	always	votes	for	her	
preferred	party	nominee	so,	availing	the	own	vote,	her	updated	belief	that	this	nominee	prevails	in	
the	election	is	greater	than	50	percent	for	our	symmetric	distribution	of	ideal	points	(cf.	Goeree	and	
Großer	2007).	As	a	consequence,	ceteris	paribus,	the	probability	of	becoming	the	leader	is	greater	
with	than	without	parties	(we	assume	that	each	entrant	is	equally	likely	her	party’s	nominee)	which,	
in	equilibrium,	translates	into	a	lower	incentive	to	run	for	office,	more	extreme	cutpoints,	and	thus	
fewer	entrants.	Second,	political	parties	enable	implicit	vote	coordination;	that	is,	citizens	vote	for	the	
nominee	whose	ideal	point	is	from	the	same	direction	as	the	own	one.	Importantly,	such	coordination	
is	welfare	enhancing	in	expectation	since	the	majority	party	is	more	likely	to	win.	Notice	that	while	
the	majority	can	sometimes	also	be	defeated	if	none	of	its	citizens	runs	for	office,	this	must	not	be	
inefficient	 as	 they	 are	 all	 more	 moderate	 than	 the	 respective	 cutpoint.	 Overall,	 in	 expectation,	
political	parties	raise	welfare	since	the	lower	total	entry	expense	and	greater	chances	of	the	majority	
party	outweigh	the	greater	total	policy	loss	caused	by	more	extreme	leaders.	
By	including	treatments	both	with	and	without	political	parties,	our	experiment	offers	a	clean	
test	of	the	hypothesis	that	party‐organized	elections	increase	political	polarization	on	average	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 do	 not	 reduce	welfare.	 The	 experiment	 also	 varies	 the	 environment	 in	 two	 other	
dimensions:	electorate	size	and	entry	cost.	Both	of	 these	have	 intuitive	qualitative	effects,	 that	 is,	
expected	entry	rates	(i.e.,	entry	as	a	fraction	of	the	electorate	size)	decrease	in	both	electorate	size	
and	entry	cost.	The	decrease	 in	entry	rates	arises	 from	the	equilibrium	cutpoints	becoming	more	
extreme,	which	immediately	 implies	that	political	polarization	is	 increasing	in	both	the	electorate	
size	and	the	entry	cost.	
Looking	 ahead	 at	 the	 results	 briefly,	 in	 all	 treatments	 conducted	 in	 the	 experiment,	 we	
observe	the	key	polarization	effect:	the	probability	of	candidate	entry	is	increasing	in	the	distance	
between	 the	 median	 and	 a	 citizen’s	 ideal	 point.	 All	 of	 the	 model’s	 primary	 comparative	 static	
properties	of	entry	behavior	find	support	in	the	data.	And,	all	the	model’s	primary	comparative	static	
properties	about	welfare	are	also	supported.	Quantitatively,	relative	to	the	theoretical	equilibrium,	
we	 observe	 higher	 rates	 of	 entry	 for	 those	 treatments	where	 entry	 is	 predicted	 to	 be	 below	 50	
percent	 and	 weakly	 lower	 entry	 rates	 for	 those	 treatments	 where	 predicted	 entry	 is	 above	 50	
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percent.	This	pattern	of	departure	from	BNE	is	consistent	with	past	experiments	on	entry	in	much	
different	settings	(see	Goeree	and	Holt	2005)	and	is	a	general	property	of	regular	quantal	response	
equilibrium	in	these	games	(Goeree,	Holt	and	Palfrey	2005,	2016).	
	
2.	Related	literature	
We	are	aware	of	just	three	other	citizen	candidate	experiments,	which	all	study	plurality	elections	
with	 complete	 information	 about	 candidate	 ideal	 points	 and	 vary	 the	 entry	 cost	 (Cadigan	 2005;	
Elbittar	 and	 Gomberg	 2009;	 Kamm	 2016).3	 Specifically,	 Cadigan	 (2005)	 uses	 a	 pen‐and‐paper	
experiment	with	electorates	of	 five	participants	who	have	distinct	 ideal	points	and	independently	
and	simultaneously	decide	on	whether	to	become	a	candidate.	The	electoral	composition	and	ideal	
points	 are	 constant	 throughout,	 but	 after	 each	 election	 ideal	 points	 are	 reallocated	 among	 the	
participants.	Further,	participants	automatically	vote	sincerely	for	the	candidate	nearest	to	the	own	
location	to	select	the	leader,	who	receives	a	bonus	and	whose	ideal	point	is	declared	the	common	
policy.	If	nobody	enters,	then	one	participant	is	randomly	appointed	the	leader.	Elbittar	and	Gomberg	
(2009)	and	Kamm	(2016)	employ	setups	similar	to	the	one	just	described,	but	a	few	differences	are	
worth	 mentioning.	 For	 example,	 their	 experiments	 are	 computerized	 and	 sincere	 votes	 are	
exclusively	 cast	 by	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 non‐candidate	 robots	 with	 uniformly	 distributed	 ideal	
points	 over	 the	 continuum	ሾ0,100ሿ.	 Also,	 Elbittar	 and	 Gomberg	 use	 electorates	 of	 three	 or	 five	
participants	located	at	three	feasible	policies,	and	the	default	policy	if	none	of	them	enters	is	that	all	
must	 pay	 a	 large	 penalty.4	 We	 can	 summarize	 the	 three	 main	 common	 results	 of	 these	 citizen	
candidate	experiments	as	follows.	First,	there	are	more	candidates	on	average	when	the	entry	cost	is	
lower.	 Second,	 relative	 to	 Nash	 equilibrium	 (NE),	 there	 is	 over‐entry	 on	 average.	 Third,	 the	
qualitative	 predictions	 of	 entry	 are	 mostly	 supported	 by	 the	 data	 and	 some	 learning	 towards	
equilibrium	play	is	observed.	Looking	more	closely	at	their	results,	if	the	entry	cost	is	high	the	unique	
NE	is	that	only	the	median	citizen	enters	(Elbittar	and	Gomberg	have	two	equilibria,	each	where	one	
of	 two	median	 citizens	 enters).	 The	median	 participant	 does	 indeed	 enter	 often	 but,	 against	 the	
                                                            
3	Our	study	is	also	related	to	simpler	entry	experiments.	For	example,	Fischbacher	and	Thöni	(2008)	examine	a	winner‐
take‐all	market	where	a	monetary	prize	goes	to	a	randomly	selected	entrant,	and	the	expected	amount	falls	in	the	number	
of	entrants.	They	find	over‐entry	relative	to	Nash	equilibrium,	and	more	severe	so	in	larger	groups.	Or,	Camerer	and	Lovallo	
(1999)	 find	 under‐entry	 with	 asymmetric,	 randomly	 allocated	 rank‐based	 payoffs.	 Both	 studies	 contain	 features	 also	
present	in	our	work,	namely,	the	probability	of	getting	the	bonus	falls	in	the	number	of	entrants	and	expected	payoffs	are	
asymmetric	 due	 to	 various	 different	 ideal	 points.	 Finally,	 Goeree	 and	 Holt	 (2005)	 use	 quantal	 response	 equilibrium	
(McKelvey	and	Palfrey	1995,	1998)	to	make	sense	of	both	over‐	and	under‐entry	in	various	entry	experiments.	
4	In	the	citizen	candidate	model	a	default	policy	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	a	common	policy	is	executed	in	equilibrium.	But	
out‐of‐equilibrium	play	occurs	in	the	lab	and	in	Elbittar	and	Gomberg	(2009)	the	penalty	resulted	in	bankruptcy	of	some	
participants.	See	Großer	and	Palfrey	(2014)	for	a	discussion	of	different	default	policies.	
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prediction,	 so	do	her	 or	 his	 immediate	neighbors	 (albeit	 to	 a	much	 lesser	 extent	 in	Cadigan).	By	
contrast,	two	equilibria	arise	for	a	low	entry	cost,	one	with	only	the	median	citizen	entering	and	one	
with	the	median’s	immediate	neighbors	entering	(again,	Elbittar	and	Gomberg	have	multiple	such	
equilibria).	However,	in	the	experiments	coordination	on	one	of	these	pure	strategy	equilibria	usually	
doesn’t	 occur.	 Next,	 in	 addition	 to	 plurality	 elections	 Elbittar	 and	Gomberg	 (2009)	 study	 run‐off	
elections	and	Kamm	(2016)	examines	proportional	representation.	Elbittar	and	Gomberg	observe	a	
predicted	shift	in	average	entry	towards	the	median	in	run‐off	elections	relative	to	plurality	voting.	
Kamm	adopts	proportional	representation	à	 la	Hamlin	and	Hjortlund	(2000),	where	 the	common	
policy	is	the	vote‐weighted	average	of	the	candidate	ideal	points	and	the	leader	bonus	is	given	to	the	
contender	with	most	votes	(ties	are	broken	randomly).	As	predicted,	he	finds	more	polarized	entry	
than	with	plurality	voting.	Although	we	too	explore	plurality	voting	and	how	the	entry	cost	affects	
the	 decision	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 our	 study	 is	 very	 different	 from	 these	 other	 citizen	 candidate	
experiments.	 In	 particular,	 we	 explore	 incomplete	 information	 about	 candidate	 ideal	 points,	 as	
opposed	 to	 the	 complete	 information	 they	 study,	 which	 yields	 mostly	 unique	 distributional	
predictions	of	who	enters.	And,	we	also	present	the	first	citizen	candidate	experiment	examining	how	
parties	and	electorate	size	influence	political	polarization	and	welfare.	
3.	The	model	
We	adapt	the	Großer	and	Palfrey	(2014)	citizen	candidate	model	with	a	continuous	policy	space	for	
the	case	of	a	discrete	policy	space,	which	is	implemented	in	the	experiment.	An	electorate	of	݊ 	citizens	
is	electing	a	leader	to	implement	a	common	policy	ߛ	from	the	set	Γ ൌ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ.	Each	citizen	i	has	
a	privately	known	ideal	point	ݔ௜	that	is	an	iid	draw	from	a	uniform	distribution	also	over	Γ,	where	i’s	
payoff	from	the	policy	outcome,	ݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ ൌ െ|ݔ௜ െ ߛ|,	is	linearly	decreasing	in	the	absolute	distance	
between	her	ideal	point	and	the	policy	outcome,	ߛ.	
3.1.	Equilibrium	without	parties	
We	first	describe	and	analyze	the	case	where	there	are	no	parties.	In	the	first	stage	(Entry),	citizens	
independently	and	simultaneously	decide	whether	to	enter	as	a	candidate	and	pay	a	cost	ܿ ൐ 0,	or	
not	enter	and	bear	no	cost.	In	the	second	stage	(Voting),	each	citizen	(including	each	of	the	entrants)	
votes	for	one	of	the	candidates,	possibly	herself.	The	candidate	with	the	most	votes	is	elected	and	
receives	 an	office	holding	benefit	 of	ܾ ൒ 0.	Ties	 are	broken	 randomly.	 If	 no	 citizen	 enters,	 then	 a	
default	policy,	d,	takes	effect,	randomly	selecting	one	citizen	as	the	leader	who	receives	ܾ	but	does	
not	pay	ܿ.	 The	 leader’s	 ideal	 point	 is	 implemented	 as	 the	policy	 outcome.	 Summarizing,	 the	 total	
payoff	of	citizen	݅	is	given	by	
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ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ, ݁௜, ݓ௜ሻ ൌ ܭ െ |ݔ௜ െ ߛ| െ ݁௜ܿ ൅ ݓ௜ܾ,																																												ሺ1ሻ	
where	K	is	a	constant,	݁௜ ൌ 1	if	she	entered	(݁௜ ൌ 0	otherwise)	and	ݓ௜ ൌ 1	if	she	is	the	leader	(ݓ௜ ൌ 0	
otherwise).	We	assume	citizen	݅	is	risk	neutral	and	maximizes	the	expected	value	of	ߨ௜.	
The	 perfect	 Bayesian	 equilibrium	 (PBE)	 of	 our	 citizen	 candidate	 game	 has	 the	 following	
properties.5	 In	 the	 Voting	 stage,	 each	 candidate	 votes	 for	 herself	 and	 each	 non‐candidate	 votes	
randomly	with	equal	probability	for	one	of	the	contenders.	In	the	symmetric	BNE	of	the	Entry	stage	
each	citizen	݅	follows	the	cutpoint	strategy	
݁̌௜ ൌ ቊ
0 ݂݅ ݔ௜ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽ
1 ݂݅ ݔ௜ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽ ∪ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽ,
																																																ሺ2ሻ	
where	 ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ	 is	 an	 ideal	 point	 pair	 with	 1 ൑ ුݔ௟ ൑ 50	 and	 ුݔ௥ ൌ 101 െ ුݔ௟.6	 That	 is,	 the	 cutpoint	
strategy	݁̌௜	dictates	that	each	citizen	with	an	ideal	point	at	or	more	“extreme”	than	ුݔ௟	or	ුݔ௥	runs	for	
office,	 and	 each	 citizen	 with	 an	 ideal	 point	 more	 “moderate”	 than	ුݔ௟	 and	ුݔ௥	 does	 not	 run.	 The	
equilibrium	cutpoints	are	derived	by	comparing	a	citizen’s	expected	payoffs	 for	entering	and	not	
entering,	given	 that	other	 individuals	are	using	such	cutpoints	 (see	appendix	 for	details).	For	 the	
specification	assumed	here,	if	all	other	citizens	݆ ് ݅	are	using	cutpoint	strategy	ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ,	the	optimal	
entry	strategy	of	a	citizen	type	ݔ௜	is	to	enter	if	and	only	if	
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧																																																																							ሺ3ሻ	
൅ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
݌௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ 1݉ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧ ൒ ܿ,	
where	the	left‐hand	side	(LHS)	gives	the	difference	between	the	expected	benefit	from	entering	and	
expected	benefit	from	not	entering,	excluding	the	cost	of	entry,	which	appears	on	the	right‐hand	side	
(RHS).	We	use	the	notation	݉ ≡ ∑ ݁௜௡௜ୀଵ 	to	denote	the	number	of	entrants	and	݌	to	denote	the	ex‐ante	
probability	that	a	randomly	selected	citizen	݆ ് ݅	enters.	If	nobody	enters,	then	the	default	policy	d	
takes	 effect,	where	 the	 expected	 loss	 from	 the	 absolute	distance	 in	 citizen	݅’s	 ideal	 point	 and	 the	
common	policy,	or	policy	loss,	is	given	by	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ ൌ 11 െ ݌ ෍
|ݔ௜ െ ݔ|
100
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
,																															ሺ4ሻ	
                                                            
5	For	details	see	Appendix	A	and	Großer	and	Palfrey	(2014).	
6	The	symmetry	of	the	cutpoints	around	the	median	ideal	point	arises	because	the	uniform	distribution	of	ideal	points	is	
symmetric	around	the	median.	In	general,	the	cutpoints	can	be	asymmetrically	located	if	the	distribution	is	asymmetric.	See	
Großer	and	Palfrey	(2014)	for	details.	
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and	if	at	least	one	citizen	݆ ് ݅	enters,	the	respective	expected	policy	loss	is	given	by	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ ൌ 1݌ ቎෍
|ݔ௜ െ ݔ|
100
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
൅ ෍ |ݔ௜ െ ݔ|100
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀ௫ුೝ
቏ .																																ሺ5ሻ	
The	LHS	of	ሺ3ሻ	has	a	straightforward	interpretation.	The	first	term	corresponds	to	the	event	that	no	
citizen	݆ ് ݅	enters,	which	occurs	with	probability	ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ.	The	intuition	is	that	if	only	citizen	݅	
enters,	then	she	can	ensure	leadership	by	entering	and	so	receives	ܾ	and	avoids	an	expected	loss	ሺ4ሻ	
from	someone	else’s	policy	decision.	Note	 that	 if	 ݅	 does	not	 enter,	 these	 two	payoffs	 accrue	with	
probability	1/݊	and	ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ/݊,	respectively,	due	to	the	specification	of	the	stochastic	default	policy,	
d.	The	second	term	on	the	LHS	of	ሺ3ሻ	represents	the	event	where	at	least	one	other	citizen	݆	enters.	
For	each	possible	number	of	entrants	݉ ൒ 2,	including	herself,	citizen	݅	both	receives	ܾ	and	avoids	a	
loss	from	policy	with	probability	1/݉.	The	expected	policy	loss	is	different	depending	on	whether	
the	leader’s	ideal	point	is	in	the	same	direction	as	݅’s	ideal	point,	which	is	captured	by	the	two	terms	
in	brackets	in	ሺ5ሻ.	Finally,	our	experimental	parameters	yield	interior	equilibrium	entry	cutpoints,	
which	is	computed	by	setting	ݔ௜ ൌ ුݔ௟	and	ුݔ௥ ൌ ුݔ௟	and	then	solving	(3)	at	equality.	
3.2.	Equilibrium	with	parties	
In	 elections	where	 the	 entry	 stage	 is	 organized	by	 ideological	 political	 parties,	 the	 two	decision‐
making	 stages	 have	 the	 following	 differences.	 First,	 all	 citizens	with	 an	 ideal	 point	 ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽ	
(ሼ51, … 100ሽ)	 automatically	 belong	 to	 the	Left	 (Right)	Party.	 If	 one	 or	more	 citizens	 from	a	party	
choose	 to	 enter,	 then	 one	 of	 them	becomes	 the	party	 nominee	 in	 the	 election.	 For	 simplicity	we	
assume	each	candidate	from	the	party	is	selected	as	the	party’s	nominee	with	equal	probability.	The	
party	affiliation	of	each	nominee,	albeit	not	exact	ideal	point,	is	then	revealed	to	all	citizens.	Further,	
each	citizen	votes	for	a	nominee,	possibly	herself.	If	only	one	party	has	a	nominee,	everyone	must	
vote	for	her.	If	nobody	enters,	then	the	default	policy	݀	is	activated.	As	in	the	case	with	no	parties,	the	
chosen	leader’s	ideal	point	is	implemented	as	the	policy	outcome.	
The	PBE	of	the	citizen	candidate	game	with	parties	has	the	following	structure.	In	the	Voting	
stage,	each	nominee	votes	for	herself	and	each	non‐nominee,	entrant	or	not,	votes	for	the	nominee	
who	yields	her	the	highest	expected	payoff.	This	will	be	the	nominee	from	their	own	party	(whose	
ideal	point	is	expected	to	be	closer	to	the	own	taste),	if	there	is	one.	In	the	symmetric	BNE	equilibrium	
of	the	Entry	stage	each	citizen	follows	a	cutpoint	strategy	as	in	ሺ2ሻ.	Analogous	to	expression	(3),	the	
optimal	entry	strategy	of	a	citizen	with	ideal	point	ݔ௜	in	the	Right	Party	is	to	enter	if	and	only	if	(and	
similar	for	a	citizen	in	the	Left	Party):	
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ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧	
൅ ෍ ൬ ݊ െ 1݉௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ݌2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ೝ 1݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൧																								ሺ6ሻ	
			൅ ෍ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉௟ ൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
ቀ݌2ቁ
௠೗ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠೗ିଵ ൬݊ െ ݉௟ െ 1݇ ൰ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
																																
ൈ ߩ௥ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ൧	
																൅ ෍ ෍ ෍ ൬ ݊ െ 1݉௥ െ 1൰ ൬
݊ െ ݉௥
݉௟ ൰
௡ି௠
௞ୀ଴
௡ି௠ೝ
௠೗ୀଵ
௡ିଵ
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ݌2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ቀ݌2ቁ
௠೗
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ ቀ݊ െ ݉݇ ቁ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠
ൈ ߩ௥݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൧ ൒ ܿ.	
The	ex‐ante	probability	of	a	random	citizen	݆ ് ݅	entering	from	either	direction	is	denoted	by	݌,	and	
the	number	of	entrants	from	the	Left	and	Right	Party	is	denoted	by	݉௟	and	݉௥,	respectively,	with	݉ ≡
	݉௟ ൅ ݉௥.	Also	note	 that	 the	probability	a	random	citizen	enters	as	Left	Party	 candidate	(or	Right	
Party	candidate)	is	݌/2	since	the	distribution	of	ideal	points	is	uniform.	The	win	probability	of	the	
Right	Party	is	denoted	by	ߩ௥ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠ೝା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	with	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
,	and	the	expected	policy	
losses	in	the	respective	terms	are	given	by	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ ൌ 11 െ ݌ ෍
|ݔ௜ െ ݔ|
100
௫ුೝିଵ
௫ୀ௫ු೗ାଵ
; 																																						ሺ7ሻ	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ ൌ 1݌/2෍
|ݔ௜ െ ݔ|
100 ;
௫ු೗
௫ୀଵ
																																														ሺ8ሻ	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ ൌ 1݌/2 ෍
|ݔ௜ െ ݔ|
100 .
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀ௫ුೝ
																																													ሺ9ሻ	
The	first	term	on	the	LHS	of	ሺ6ሻ	is	the	same	as	in	ሺ3ሻ	and	represents	the	case	where	no	citizen	݆ ് ݅	
enters.	The	second	term	gives	the	cases	where	at	least	one	݆	also	enters	from	the	Right	Party,	but	no	
one	enters	from	the	Left	Party.	In	these	events,	citizen	݅	anticipates	gains	ܾ/݉௥	and,	from	policy	loss	
avoidance,	1/݉௥ ൈ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ	 because	 one	 of	 the	 ݉௥	 Right	 Party	 entrants	 is	
randomly	appointed	the	nominee	of	this	party.	The	third	term	on	ܮܪܵሺ6ሻ	gives	the	cases	where	at	
least	 one	 citizen	 ݆ ് ݅	 enters	 from	 the	Left	Party,	 but	 only	 citizen	 ݅	 enters	 from	 the	Right	Party,	
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so	݉௥ ൌ 1	and	she	secures	the	Right	Party	nomination.	Due	to	symmetry,	each	of	the	݊ െ ݉௟ െ 1	non‐
entrants	with	ideal	points	strictly	within	the	equilibrium	cutpoint	pair	prefers	the	Left	or	Right	Party	
nominee	with	probability	one‐half	for	each,	and	votes	accordingly	(as	accounted	for	by	the	index	݇	of	
the	 summation).	 Since	 citizen	 ݅	 is	 in	 the	Right	Party,	 her	 expected	 net	 gains	 from	 entry	 are	ߩ௥ܾ	
and	ߩ௥ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ	 (i.e.,	 the	 policy	 loss	 avoided	 if	 the	 opponent	 nominee	 runs	
unopposed).	 Note	 that	ߩ௥	 declines	with	 each	Left	Party	 entrant,	who	 is	 expected	 to	 vote	 for	 this	
party’s	nominee.	The	fourth	term	of	the	LHS	of	ሺ6ሻ	represents	the	cases	where	at	least	one	citizen	݆ ്
݅	 enters	 from	 each	 direction,	 which	 yields	 a	 mix	 of	 the	 second	 and	 third	 terms.	 Finally,	 our	
experimental	parameters	yield	interior	equilibrium	entry	cutpoints	characterized	by	solutions	to	(6),	
at	equality.	
4.	Experimental	design	
The	 experiment	 was	 conducted	 at	 the	 Experimental	 Social	 Science	 Laboratory	 at	 Florida	 State	
University.7	A	total	of	148	students	participated	in	eight	sessions	of	16	or	20	participants	each,	with	
each	session	lasting	about	1.5	hours.	Earnings	were	expressed	in	points	and	exchanged	for	cash	for	
$1	per	250	points	at	the	end	of	a	session.	Participants	earned	on	average	$22.91,	including	$7	for	
showing	up.	
	 In	 a	 222	 treatment	 design,	 we	 varied	 the	 “entry	 cost”	 (ܿ ൌ 10	 and	 20	 points)	 within	
subjects	 and	 “group	 size”	 (݊ ൌ 4	 and	 10)	 and	 “party	 mode”	 (ߠ ൌ ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ	 and	 Party)	 between	
subjects.	Each	session	had	two	parts	of	30	decision	periods	each,	where	the	entry	cost	changed	from	
one	part	to	the	next	and	the	cost	order	changed	across	sessions.	Participants	knew	there	are	two	
parts,	but	were	instructed	about	the	second	part	only	after	completing	the	first	one.	In	all	treatments,	
at	 the	 start	 of	 each	period	 the	 subject	 pool	was	 randomly	divided	 into	 separate	 4‐	 or	 10‐person	
groups	that	did	not	interact	with	one	another	in	this	period,	and	each	participant	received	a	new	ideal	
point	and,	entirely	independently,	a	new	letter	ID	label.	They	were	informed	that	ideal	points	are	iid	
random	draws	from	a	uniform	distribution	over	the	integers	ሼ1, 2, … , 100ሽ	and	private	information	
(i.e.,	not	shown	to	others),	and	that	letter	IDs	are	iid	draws	from	a	uniform	distribution	over	the	whole	
alphabet	and	revealed	to	everyone	in	the	group	(albeit	the	participant	behind	a	letter	ID	remained	
anonymous).	In	a	given	group	and	period	different	individuals	could	have	the	same	ideal	point	but	
never	the	same	letter	ID.	
	 Each	period	consisted	of	two	consecutive	stages	where	the	participants	independently	and	
simultaneously	made	their	decisions	without	communication.	In	the	Entry	stage,	each	group	member	
                                                            
7	 The	 software	 was	 programmed	 as	 server/client	 applications	 in	 Java,	 using	 the	 experimental	 open	 source	 package	
Multistage	(http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu:8000/multistage/).	To	recruit	participants,	we	used	ORSEE	(Greiner	2015).	
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decided	on	whether	to	enter	the	political	competition	and	pay	c	points,	or	not	enter	and	bear	no	cost.	
In	the	Voting	stage,	in	No	Party	the	letter	ID	for	each	(independent)	candidate	was	displayed	on	the	
computer	 screen	 with	 a	 button	 labeled	 with	 her	 or	 his	 letter	 ID	 (a	 candidate’s	 own	 label	 was	
highlighted	in	red).	In	Party,	one	of	the	entrants	with	an	ideal	point	ݔ௜ ∈ ሼ1, … , 50ሽ	(ሼ51, … , 100ሽ)	was	
randomly	 selected	 as	 the	Left	 (Right)	Party	 nominee,	with	 equal	 probability	 for	 each,	 and	 a	 lone	
entrant	was	the	nominee	outright.	If	nobody	entered	from	a	party,	then	the	party	had	no	nominee.	
Each	nominee	was	displayed	on	the	computer	screen	with	a	button	labeled	with	her	or	his	letter	ID	
(a	nominee’s	own	label	was	highlighted	in	red).8	Thus,	everyone	was	informed	that	a	nominee’s	ideal	
point	is	from	the	left	or	right	subset	of	ideal	points,	but	the	exact	location	was	not	revealed.	Next,	each	
participant	 voted	 by	 clicking	 one	 of	 the	 candidate	 or	 nominee	 buttons	 and	 could	 not	 abstain.9	
Candidates	and	nominees	were	not	forced	to	vote	for	themselves.	The	candidate	or	nominee	with	the	
most	 votes	 was	 appointed	 the	 leader	 and	 received	 a	 bonus	 of	ܾ ൌ 5	 points,	 with	 ties	 broken	
randomly.	If	nobody	entered,	then	one	participant	was	randomly	and	equiprobably	appointed	the	
leader	 (and	 received	 ܾ ൌ 5	 points	 but	 did	 not	 pay	 c).	 Either	 way,	 the	 leader’s	 ideal	 point	 was	
implemented	as	the	policy	outcome.	After	the	election,	everyone	was	informed	about	the	number	of	
votes	 for	 each	 candidate	 or	 nominee,	 the	 leader’s	 letter	 ID,	 the	 policy	 outcome,	 the	 own	 period	
earnings,	and	reminded	whether	she	or	he	entered	and	was	a	leader	(and	thus	paid	c	and	received	
b).10	In	addition,	the	bottom	of	the	screen	contained	a	history	panel	where	at	any	time	participants	
could	view	 this	 information	 from	all	 previous	periods.	Participants	were	paid	 for	all	 2 ൈ 30 ൌ 60	
periods.	One	unpaid	practice	round	was	conducted	to	familiarize	them	with	the	user	interface.11	
Table	 1	 summarizes	 our	 experimental	 design	 (first	 six	 columns)	 and	 quantitative	 BNE	
predictions	 of	 the	 relevant	 observable	 variables	 (last	 five	 columns;	 denoted	 by	 an	 asterisk	 and	
subscript	 e	 for	 expected	 values).	 Each	 treatment	 ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ	 has	 a	 unique	 symmetric	 cutpoint	 pair	
ሺුݔ௟∗, ුݔ௥∗ሻ	 that	 determines	 the	 individual	 entry	 probability,	݌∗	 (and	 thus	 the	 expected	 number	 of	
                                                            
8	In	the	experiment,	a	participant’s	ideal	point	was	termed	“your	best	outcome.”	In	Party,	we	labeled	left	and	right	as	“low	
number”	 and	 “high	 number”	 and	 citizens	 and	 nominees	 as	 “low/high	 number	 members“	 and	 “low/high	 number	
candidates,“	 respectively.	 Also,	with	 two	 nominees	 the	 button	 of	 the	Left	Party	 nominee	was	 always	 to	 the	 left	 of	 the	
opponent’s	button.	In	No	Party,	“candidate”	buttons	were	centered	and	ordered	randomly	from	left	to	right,	independent	
of	letter	IDs.	In	fact,	in	a	group	and	period	different	participants	could	see	different	ID	orderings.	
9	Since	in	theory	non‐nominees	in	Party	strictly	prefer	voting	to	abstaining	while	non‐candidates	in	No	Party	are	indifferent	
between	the	two	options,	we	chose	mandatory	voting	to	keep	the	No	Party	and	Party	designs	as	similar	as	possible.	Future	
experiments	can	explore	voluntary	voting.		
10	While	the	leader’s	exact	ideal	point	was	always	revealed	by	the	policy	outcome,	we	did	not	disclose	anyone	else’s	ideal	
point.	However,	in	Party	with	two	nominees	their	vote	tallies	indicated,	albeit	somewhat	imperfectly	due	to	unexpected	
voting	in	the	lab,	how	many	ideal	points	were	from	the	left	and	right	direction,	respectively.	We	chose	to	give	participants	
relatively	little	feedback	in	order	to	keep	the	experimental	design	closer	to	the	theory.	
11	The	online	supporting	material	includes	instructions	and	sample	screenshots	of	the	computer	display.	Due	to	a	minor	
programming	error	that	we	learned	about	only	after	all	the	data	was	collected,	the	ideal	point	100	never	occurred.	Our	
analysis	of	the	data	assumes	that	participants	were	unaware	of	this.	
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entrants,	݉௘∗),	 for	which	we	 also	 compute	 the	 ex‐ante	 expected	 individual	 payoff,	ߨ௘∗ ൌ ܭ െ 	ݒ௘∗ െ
݌∗ܿ ൅ ܾ/݊,	where	ܭ ൌ 100	and	ݒ௘∗	denotes	the	expected	policy	loss.	
Table	1:	Experimental	design	and	symmetric	BNE	predictions	in	the	entry	game	
	 Design	 BNE	predictions	
n	 c	 Party	
#Subjects	
(Sessions)	
#	
Elections #Obs.
Cutpoints
[ුݔ௟∗, ුݔ௥∗] ݌∗	 ߨ௘∗	 ݒ௘∗	 ݌∗ܿ	
4	 10	 No	 36	(2)	 270 1,080 [42,	59] 0.84 66.98	 25.87	 8.40
4	 10	 Yes	 32	(2)	 240 960 [34,	67] 0.68 69.09	 25.36	 6.80
4	 20	 No	 36	(2)	 270 1,080 [20,	81] 0.40 64.59	 28.66	 8.00
4	 20	 Yes	 32	(2)	 240 960 [17,	84] 0.34 66.69	 27.76	 6.80
10	 10	 No	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [21,	80] 0.42 59.71	 36.59	 4.20
10	 10	 Yes	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [14,	87] 0.28 61.24	 36.46	 2.80
10	 20	 No	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [10,	91] 0.20 57.59	 38.91	 4.00
10	 20	 Yes	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [08,	93] 0.16 59.90	 37.40	 3.20
Note:	All	sessions	had	two	parts,	each	with	a	different	entry	cost	for	30	periods.	Each	treatment	used	a	leader	
bonus	of	ܾ ൌ 5	points	and	a	uniform	distribution	of	ideal	points	over	the	integers	ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ.	Note	that	the	
two	Party	treatments	with	ܿ ൌ 10	points	have	an	additional	BNE	with	two	cutpoint	pairs	(see	footnote	17).		
5.	Hypotheses	 	
The	first	hypothesis	captures	the	most	important	property	of	the	BNE	in	the	Entry	game:	
H1:	Political	Polarization.	In	every	treatment,	the	entry	rates	are	a	weakly	increasing	function	of	
the	distance	between	ideal	points	and	the	median	of	the	policy	space.	
The	next	 four	hypotheses	 specify	 the	primary	 comparative	 statics	derived	based	on	BNE,	
from	 directly	 comparable	 pairs	 of	 treatments	 that	 differ	 only	 with	 respect	 to	 one	 variable	 (as	
compared	to	secondary	qualitative	predictions	where	treatments	differ	in	two	or	three	variables).		
H2:	Party	Effect.		Holding	the	entry	cost	and	group	size	constant,	expected	equilibrium	entry	is	lower	
with	party‐mediated	elections	than	without	parties.	This	implies	four	specific	hypotheses	in	terms	of	
pairwise	comparisons	for	݌ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ	(the	effect	is	the	same	for	݉௘ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ):	
݌∗ሺ4,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐	݌∗ሺ4,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
݌∗ሺ4,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐	݌∗ሺ4,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ.	
H3:	Size	Effect.		Holding	the	entry	cost	and	party	mode	constant,	in	equilibrium,	the	probability	of	
entry	݌	is	decreasing	in	݊.	This	gives	four	specific	hypotheses	in	the	form	of	pairwise	comparisons	
for	݌:	
a) Entry	probability:	
݌∗ሺ૝, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
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݌∗ሺ૝, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ૝, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ૝, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
H4:	Cost	Effect.	 	Holding	 the	 group	 size	 and	party	mode	 constant,	 expected	 equilibrium	entry	 is	
decreasing	in	ܿ,	which	implies	four	hypotheses	in	terms	of	pairwise	comparisons	for	݌	(the	effect	is	
the	same	for		݉௘):	
݌∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10, ૚૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
H5:	Welfare	 Effect.	 The	 hypotheses	 for	 equilibrium	 expected	 welfare,	 measured	 by	 expected	
individual	payoffs, ߨ௘,	have	the	same	signs	as	for	݌	in	H3	(size	effect)	and	H4	(cost	effect),	but	the	
opposite	signs	in	H2	(party	effect).	
a) Party:		
ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏	ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏	ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ.	
b) Group	size:		
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
c) Entry	cost:		
ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૚૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
	 As	an	even	more	 stringent	 test	of	 the	equilibrium	model,	 the	BNE	of	 the	entry	game	also	
generates	 predictions	 about	 the	 complete	 order	 of	 qualitative	 predictions	 across	 all	 treatments,	
varying	all	the	treatment	variables	simultaneously.	
H6:	Entry	rate	ordering.	In	equilibrium,	the	ordering	of		݌	across	all	treatments	is:	
݌∗ሺ4,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,20,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ
൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
H7:	Welfare	ordering.	In	equilibrium,	the	ordering	of		ߨ௘	across	all	treatments	is:	
ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ
൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
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6.	Experimental	results:	An	examination	of	H1‐H7	
This	 section	 presents	 and	 analyzes	 the	 aggregate	 data	 as	 it	 relates	 specifically	 to	 the	 seven	
hypotheses	listed	above.	In	the	next	section,	we	take	a	deeper	look	at	the	individual	level	data.	
6.1	The	polarization	hypothesis	(H1)	
The	polarization	hypothesis	specifies	that	more	extreme	citizens	are	(weakly)	more	likely	to	enter	as	
candidates.	This	is	 implied	by	the	BNE	of	the	entry	game	for	all	 treatments	in	the	experiment.	An	
exact	comparison	of	the	data	to	the	theory	clearly	rejects	BNE,	which	makes	the	sharp	prediction	that	
entry	rates	should	be	either	zero	or	one	depending	on	whether	a	citizen’s	ideal	point	is	sufficiently	
extreme.	Of	course	the	data	is	not	discontinuous	like	this.	Therefore,	we	fit	a	logit	regression	model	
of	the	probability	of	entry	as	a	function	of	the	distance	of	an	ideal	point	from	the	median.	Since	this	
is	a	strategic	game	rather	than	a	simple	individual	choice,	so	that	if	the	players’	entry	functions	are	
logit	functions	rather	than	strict	cutpoint	pairs,	this	in	turn	changes	all	of	the	players’	responses	in	
the	game.	Thus,	we	analyze	the	data	using	logit	quantal	response	equilibrium	of	the	game,	or	logit	
QRE	(McKelvey	and	Palfrey	1995,	1998;	Goeree,	Holt,	and	Palfrey	2016).	
QRE	 is	 a	 statistical	 generalization	 of	 NE	 that	 allows	 for	 decision‐making	 errors	 that	 are	
systematic	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 more	 lucrative	 decisions	 are	 made	 more	 often	 than	 less	 lucrative	
decisions.	 In	 the	 logit	 specification	 of	QRE,	 the	 parameter	ߣ ൒ 0	 represents	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 logit	
response	function,	with	lower	values	indicating	a	flatter	response	(“higher	error”)	and	higher	values	
indicate	a	steeper	response.	If	ߣ ൌ 0,	decisions	are	purely	random	so	each	citizen	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽ	
enters	with	probability	one‐half.	The	rationality	level	strictly	rises	in	ߣ	until	ߣ ൎ ∞,	where	everyone	
is	virtually	 fully	 rational	 and	 follows	 the	BNE	cutpoint	 strategy.	 In	particular,	 each	citizen	 type	ݔ	
enters	with	probability	ݍሺݔሻ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ	strictly	in	between	zero	and	one,	which	depends	smoothly	on	
the	ideal	point	and	is	no	longer	a	cutpoint	strategy	that	dictates	a	“zero	or	one”	binary	choice	for	all	
ݔ.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 set	 of	 equilibrium	conditions	 that	 are	 somewhat	different	 from	 ሺ2ሻ	 to	 ሺ9ሻ	 (see	
Appendix	 A).	 The	 QRE	 entry	 probabilities	 are	 computed	 by	 simultaneously	 solving	 one‐hundred	
different	conditions,	one	for	each	possible	ݔ.12	Given	these	QRE	entry	probabilities	as	a	function	of	λ,	
we	estimate	λ	by	maximum	likelihood.	To	avoid	overfitting,	the	estimated	parameter	is	constrained	
to	be	equal	across	all	treatments.13	
                                                            
12	Note	that	ݍሺݔሻ ൌ ݍሺ101 െ ݔሻ	in	equilibrium	due	to	our	uniform	distribution	of	ideal	points,	so	we	need	only	solve	for	fifty	
conditions.	Also,	we	compute	QRE	entry	probabilities	assuming	no	errors	in	the	Voting	stage	since	unexpected	votes	are	
quite	rare	in	the	lab	(as	documented	in	the	next	section).	
13	We	also	estimated	the	QRE	model	using	an	out‐of‐sample	approach.	Rather	than	constraining	λ	to	be	constant	across	
treatments,	we	estimated	it	separately	for	each	treatment	using	only	the	odd‐numbered	periods,	and	then	used	those	odd‐
period	estimates	to	compare	predicted	and	actual	values	for	the	even‐numbered	periods.	The	conclusions	are	similar,	and	
the	in‐sample	fits	for	that	alternative	approach	are	significantly	better.	
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Table	2	shows	for	each	treatment	the	observed	entry	rate,	݌௢௕௦,	and	the	respective	BNE	and	
QRE	entry	rates	(columns	4‐6),	where	QRE	entry	rates	are	evaluated	at	the	estimated	value	of	ߣ.	The	
theoretical	predictions	are	exact,	in	the	sense	that	they	are	based	on	the	actual	draws	of	ideal	points	
realized	in	the	experiment	(i.e.,	empirical	distribution),	and	hence	are	indicated	by	subscript	emp,	
while	still	assuming	that	citizens	respond	to	the	theoretical	uniform	distribution.14	Importantly,	the	
complete	 order	 of	 qualitative	 predictions	 across	 all	 treatments	 is	 preserved	 when	 changing	 to	
empirical	 BNE	 and	 QRE.	 The	 observed	 rates	 of	 entry	 are	 averaged	 over	 all	 periods	 and	 QRE	
predictions	 use	ߣመ ൌ 0.083,	 the	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimate	 for	 all	 periods	 and	 treatments	
combined.	Furthermore,	the	scatter	plot	in	Figure	1	depicts	for	each	treatment	the	BNE	entry	rate	
݌௘௠௣∗ 	on	the	horizontal	axis	against	 the	average	observed	rate	݌௢௕௦	(markers)	and	QRE	rate	݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
(markers	linked	by	dotted	line)	on	the	vertical	axis.	
Table	2:	Entry	‐	Predictions	and	data	
n	 c Party ݌௢௕௦	 ݌௘௠௣∗ 	 ݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
4	 10 No .687	 .844	 .602	
4	 10 Yes .673	 .671	 .570	
4	 20 No .560	 .417	 .459	
4	 20 Yes .496	 .364	 .436	
10	 10 No .519	 .426	 .465	
10	 10 Yes .445	 .256	 .423	
10	 20 No .426	 .181	 .330	
10	 20 Yes .321	 .152	 .302	
Note:	Standard	errors	of	݌௢௕௦	are	all	in	the	range	ሾ.013, .016ሿ.	BNE	is	indicated	by	an	asterisk	and	QRE	byߣመ,	the	
maximum	likelihood	estimate	of	the	degree	of	error.	
An	interesting	pattern	in	the	data	that	is	clearly	seen	in	Figure	1	is	that,	relative	to	BNE	we	
find	 over‐entry	 for	 the	 treatments	 where	 ݌∗ ൏ 1/2	 and	 (weak)	 under‐entry	 for	 the	 treatments	
where	݌∗ ൐ 1/2.	This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 coincidence,	 but	 is	 a	 general	 property	of	 regular	QRE	 in	 these	
games.	The	 independent	 random	noise	 in	QRE	 flattens	out	 the	 treatment	 response	 in	entry	 rates	
compared	with	BNE,	by	pulling	the	rates	away	from	BNE	in	the	direction	of	݌ ൌ 1/2	(see	Goeree	and	
Holt	2005;	Goeree,	Holt	and	Palfrey	2016).	
	
	
                                                            
14	For	example,	in	No	Party	the	empirical	BNE	entry	rate	in	a	treatment	is	computed	by	dividing	the	number	of	observed	
ideal	points	at	or	more	extreme	than	the	two	theoretical	BNE	cutpoints	by	the	total	number	of	observed	ideal	points.	And,	
the	empirical	QRE	entry	rate	 in	a	 treatment	 is	 the	average	of	all	 theoretical	QRE	rates	per	 ideal	point,	weighted	by	the	
respective	relative	frequencies	of	observed	ideal	points.			
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Figure	1:	Entry	rates	–	Predictions	and	data	
	
Note:	The	data	markers	and	empirical	QREሺߣመ ൌ 0.083ሻ	entry	rates	use	all	periods.	
Figure	2	displays	for	each	treatment	the	observed	and	empirical	QRE	entry	rates	per	block	of	
ten	ideal	points	(solid	lines),	the	BNE	cutpoint	pair	(cross	markers	at	the	top),	and	the	theoretical	
QRE	 entry	 rate	 function	 (dashed	 lines)	 at	 the	 estimated	 value	 of	 ߣመ.15	With	 pure	 noise,	ߣ ൌ 0,	 the	
dashed	line	would	be	a	horizontal	through	݌ ൌ 0.5	and	in	BNE,	ߣ ൎ ∞,	it	would	be	a	step	function	
with	entry	rates	equal	to	one	for	all	ideal	points	at	or	more	extreme	than	the	two	cutpoints	(cross	
markers)	and	equal	to	zero	for	all	ideal	points	strictly	within	both	cutpoints.16	(see	appendix).	Not	
surprisingly,	 the	 sharp	 BNE	 cutpoint	 pairs	 are	 not	 found	 in	 the	 aggregate	 data.17	 Instead,	 in	 all	
treatments	the	entry	curves	are	U‐shaped,	which	is	a	general	property	of	QRE	in	these	games.18	
                                                            
15	Figure	B1	in		Appendix	B	displays	the	average	entry	rates	for	normalized	ideal	points,	that	is,	the	difference	between	own	
ideal	point	and	the	closer	of	the	two	BNE	cutpoints.	
16	Figure	A1	in	Appendix	A	displays	the	QRE	entry	probabilities	for	various	degrees	of	error	for	the	No	Party,	n=4,	c=20	
treatment.	These	entry	probabilities	for	other	treatments	vary	as	expected,	but	with	similar	overall	shapes.	
17	We	report	an	analysis	of	individual	cutpoints	in	the	next	section.	Behavior	in	voter	turnout	experiments	is	somewhat	
more	similar	to	BNE	cutpoints	than	in	our	study	(e.g.,	Levine	and	Palfrey	2007).	More	noise	in	decisions	here	may	arise	
from	more	complexity	in	the	citizen	candidate	game	and	little	feedback	about	other	participants’	ideal	points	(see	footnote	
10),	which	hampers	learning	towards	BNE.	
18	Notice	the	small	hills	in	QRE	around	the	median	in	Party	(lower	two	panels	in	Figure	2)	where	individuals	have	a	stronger	
incentive	to	enter	than	their	somewhat	more	extreme	neighbors.	For	sufficiently	low	entry	costs,	this	leads	to	an	additional	
BNE	with	two	cutpoint	pairs.	The	first	“outer”	pair	dictates	that	all	citizens	with	ideal	points	at	or	more	extreme	than	these	
cutpoints	enter,	and	the	second,	narrower	“inner”	pair	around	the	median	dictates	that	all	citizens	with	ideal	points	at	or	
within	this	pair	enter.	The	two	Party	treatments	with	a	low	entry	cost	have	such	an	additional	BNE.	Note	that	we	observe	
very	similar	general	entry	patterns	in	all	our	treatments.	
18 
 
Figure	2:	Entry	rates	per	ideal	point	(data	averaged	in	blocks	of	ten)	–	Predictions	and	data	
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The	statistical	significance	of	the	U‐shape	of	entry	rates	 is	supported	by	a	 logit	regression	
(clustered	by	individuals;	see	Table	3)	of	entry	decisions	on	extremeness	of	a	citizen’s	ideal	point,	
measured	by	หݔ௜,௧ െ ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห/49,	where	ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ ∈ ሼ50,51ሽ	depending	on	which	is	closer	to	ݔ௜,௧	(we	
chose	not	the	“true”	median	of	50.5	to	normalize	the	coefficient	by	dividing	by	the	maximum	distance	
of	49 ൌ 50 െ 1	or	100 െ 51).	The	regression	also	controls	 for	the	three	treatment	variables	and	a	
measure	of	experience	(first	fifteen	periods	versus	last	fifteen	periods	in	each	part).	The	coefficient	
of	หݔ௜,௧ െ ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห/49	is	positive	and	highly	significant	so	the	more	extreme	the	own	ideal	point,	the	
more	likley	a	participant	is	to	run	for	office.	This	provides	strong	support	for	H1.	We	next	turn	to	the	
hypotheses	about	specific	treatment	effects.	
Table	3:	Random‐effects	logit	regression	(all	data)	
Dependent	dummy	variable:	Entry	decision	(1	if	݁௜,௧ ൌ 1)	 	
	 	 	 Dummy	independent	variables	
	 Constant	
หݔ௜,௧ െ ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห
49
Entry	cost	
(1	if	ܿ ൌ 20)	
Group	size	
(1	if	݊ ൌ 10)	
Party	
(1	if	Party)	
Block	of	15	
periods	(1	if	2nd)
Coeff.	&	Const.			
(Std.	error)	
0.637***	
(0.211)	
1.242***								
(0.087)	
‐0.714***	
(0.051)	
‐1.054***	
(0.231)	
‐0.425*	
(0.230)	
‐0.028									
(0.050)	
Note:	*	(**;	***)	indidcates	a	one‐tailed	5%	(1%,	0.1%)	significance	level.	The	data	is	clustered	at	the	indvidual	
level.	
6.2.	Treatment	effects	on	entry	rates	and	welfare	(H2‐H5)	
Entry	rates	(p)	
As	clearly	seen	in	Table	2	and	Figure	1,	all	twelve	predicted	primary	treatment	effects	on	entry	rates	
find	support	in	the	data.	For	the	party	effect	(H2),	holding	constant	the	group	size	and	entry	cost,	the	
observed	 entry	 rates	 are	 always	 greater	 in	No	Party	 than	Party.	 For	 the	 size	 effect	 (H3),	 holding	
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constant	the	entry	cost	and	party	mode,	they	are	always	greater	with	݊ ൌ 4	than	10.	And,	for	the	cost	
effect	(H4),	holding	constant	the	group	size	and	party	mode,	they	are	always	greater	with	ܿ ൌ 10	than	
20	points.	The	results	of	the	logit	regression	reported	in	Table	3	support	these	treatment	effects:	the	
coefficients	of	Party,	Group	size,	and	Entry	cost	are	all	negative	and	statistically	significant.	While	the	
regression	uses	all	 the	data,	 the	same	results	occur	when	only	 the	respective	sessions	of	primary	
treatment	 comparisons	 are	 employed,	 except	 for	 the	 Party	 dummy	 with	 ݊ ൌ 4	 and	 ܿ ൌ 10	 (the	
coefficient	is	insignificant).	Overall,	our	experiment	provides	strong	evidence	in	favor	of	H2	to	H4	
with	respect	to	entry	decisions.	Finally,	whether	entry	decisions	are	made	in	the	first	or	second	15	
periods	in	a	treatment	makes	no	difference	(i.e.,	the	coefficient	of	Block	of	15	periods	is	insignficant).19	
Welfare	(ߨ௘)	
We	next	 turn	to	H5,	which	addresses	 the	comparative	statics	predictions	of	aggregate	welfare,	as	
measured	by	average	payoffs.	Table	4	gives	per	treatment	observed	and	predicted	(using	empirical	
ideal	point	distributions)	average	individual	payoffs.	Note	that	all	primary	qualitative	predictions	of	
payoffs	are	identical	for	BNE	and	QREሺߣመሻ,	independent	of	whether	they	are	theoretical	or	empirical	
predictions	(see	appendix).	For	the	welfare	effect	(H5),	all	twelve	primary	qualitative	predictions	find	
support	 in	 the	data.	 In	 terms	of	quantitative	comparisons	with	 the	equilibrium	predictions,	 in	all	
treatments	the	actual	average	payoff	ߨത௢௕௦	is	greater	than	in	BNE	and	weakly	smaller	than	in	QREሺߣመሻ,	
but	the	data	and	QRE	predictions	tend	to	be	much	closer	to	one	another.20	
Table	4:	Average	individual	payoffs	–	Predictions	and	data		
n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ߨത௘௠௣∗ 	 ߨത௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
4	 10	 No 69.26 67.00 70.67
4	 10	 Yes 70.42 69.06 72.14
4	 20	 No 64.22 64.00 66.95
4	 20	 Yes 68.03 66.56 68.73
10	 10	 No 64.44 60.28 65.01
10	 10	 Yes 68.31 63.98 68.31
10	 20	 No 62.61 59.25 63.24
10	 20	 Yes 64.35 61.89 65.91
Note:	Standard	errors	for	ߨത௢௕௦	are	in	the	range	ሾ.71, .82ሿ.	
Next,	Table	5	gives	the	results	of	an	OLS	regression,	clustered	by	individuals	and	pooling	all	
data,	with	the	individual	payoff	in	period	t	as	the	dependent	variable	and	the	same	five	independent	
                                                            
19	We	find	no	significant	learning	effects	in	the	data	when	using	other	specifications	of	time.	
20	Recall	that	the	QRE	was	estimated	to	fit	the	choice	probabilities	of	the	participants,	not	by	fitting	the	expected	payoffs	in	
the	game.	Table	B3	in	Appendix	B	shows	average	payoffs,	broken	down	by	policy	losses,	entry	expenses,	and	the	spoils	of	
office.Table	B4	shows	the	observed	values	for	leaders	and	non‐leaders,	respectively.	
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variables	as	in	Table	3.	As	can	be	seen,	all	of	the	predicted	effects	are	highly	significant	and	large	in	
magnitude.	And,	as	in	the	logit	regression	for	entry	rates,	there	is	no	evidence	of	learning.	
Table	5:	Random‐effects	OLS	regressions	(all	data)	
Dependent	variable:	Individual	period	payoff	 	
	 	 	 Dummy	independent	variables	
	 Constant	
|ݔ௜.௧ െ ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡|
49
Entry	cost	
(1	if	ܿ ൌ 20)	
Group	size	
(1	if	݊ ൌ 10)	
Party	
(1	if	Party)	
Block	of	15	
periods	(1	if	2nd)	
Coeff.	&	Const.			
(Std.	error)	
75.44***	
(0.76)	
‐14.14***								
(0.91)	
‐3.24***	
(0.53)	
‐3.18***	
(0.54)	
2.59***	
(0.53)	
‐0.03									
(0.53)	
Note:	*	(**;	***)	indicates	a	one‐tailed	5%	(1%,	0.1%)	significance	level.	The	data	is	clustered	at	the	indvidual	
level.	
The	reason	for	the	welfare	gains	from	party‐organized	elections	is	that,	compared	to	No	Party,	
majority	candidates	in	Party	win	more	often	on	average	since	if	there	are	two	nominees,	each	citizen	
votes	for	the	one	located	in	the	same	direction	as	herself	(below	we	show	that	participants	mostly	
vote	in	this	way).	That	is,	party	labels	provide	valuable	information	to	all	the	citizens	so	the	outcome	
more	closely	reflects	the	true	distribution	of	preferences.	Figure	3	indicates	that	for	both	݊ ൌ 4	and	
10	(left	and	right	panel,	respectively)	the	majority	wins	indeed	substantially	more	often	in	Party	than	
No	 Party	 in	 situations	 where	 it	 might	 also	 lose.21	 The	 only	 exception	 are	 majorities	 of	 nine	
participants,	which	always	provided	the	leader	in	both	party	modes.	
Figure	3:	Actual	win	proportion	and	vote	coordination	advantage	of	majority	parties	
		 	
	
	
                                                            
21		Figure	B2	in	Appendix	B	displays	the	frequency	distributions	of	the	number	of	participants	per	direction.	
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6.3	Complete	ordering	of	entry	rates	and	welfare	across	treatments	(H6	and	H7)	
As	noted	earlier,	because	BNE	produces	quantitative	predictions	about	entry	and	welfare	 for	any	
parameter	 configuration,	 it	 also	 generates	 hypotheses	 about	 comparisons	 across	 treatments	 that	
differ	 in	two	or	three	of	 the	treatment	variables.	 In	 fact,	as	stated	 in	H6	and	H7,	BNE	generates	a	
complete	strict	order	over	the	eight	treatments	with	respect	to	both	entry	rates	and	welfare.	
For	entry	rates,	this	is	most	clearly	seen	in	Figure	2	by	the	left‐right	ordering	of	the	labeled	
data	points	for	each	treatment:	with	only	one	exception,	the	data	markers	are	increasing	in	the	BNE	
entry	rate.	In	fact,	out	of	all	28	possible	qualitative	comparisons	only	one	has	an	unpredicted	sign,	
namely	݌௢௕௦ሺ4,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌௢௕௦ሺ10,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ,	for	which	the	predictions	݌௘௠௣∗ ൌ 0.417	and	
0.426	are	very	close	to	one	another.	This	provides	strong	evidence	in	favor	of	H6.	It	is	also	worth	
mentioning	that	while	the	BNE	and	QREሺߣመሻ	models	generate	the	same	treatment	ordering	of	entry	
rates,	 except	 for	 ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ݊ ൌ 4, ܿ ൌ 10ሻ	 the	 latter	 predictions	 are	 always	 nearer	 to	 the	 data.	
Interestingly,	relative	 to	BNE	we	 find	over‐entry	 if	݌∗ ൏ 0.5	and	(weak)	under‐entry	 if	݌∗ ൐ 0.5,	a	
pattern	that	was	already	reported	in	various	other	binary	choice,	entry	experiments	and	explained	
using	QRE	(Goeree	and	Holt	2005).	As	noted	before,	the	logit	QRE	model	also	generates	this	entry	
pattern.	However,	it	is	also	the	case	that	the	observed	entry	rates	are	shifted	up	relative	to	the	QRE	
fitted	estimates.	Finally,	the	complete	order	of	expected	welfare,	as	measured	by	average	individual	
payoffs	given	in	Table	4,	is	also	mostly	consistent	with	the	BNE	and	QREሺߣመሻ	predictions	(note	that	
the	two	models	predict	somewhat	different	orders).	Out	of	28	possible	qualitative	comparisons,	24	
and	25	are	correct,	respectively.	This	includes	all	twelve	of	the	one‐variable	treatment	comparisons	
discussed	 in	 the	 last	 section,	 and	 twelve	 and	 thirteen	out	of	 sixteen	of	 the	 comparisons	between	
treatments	that	differed	in	more	than	one	dimension.	Thus,	the	data	provide	some	support	for	H7,	
but	weaker	than	the	solid	support	that	we	find	for	H6.	
7.	Experimental	results:	Individual	behavior	
7.1	Voting	behavior	
The	 predicted	 voting	 behavior	 in	 BNE	 is	 quite	 simple:	 ሺ1ሻ	 each	 candidate	 in	No	Party	 and	 each	
nominee	in	Party	votes	for	herself;	ሺ2ሻ	with	two	nominees	each	non‐nominee	votes	for	the	one	whose	
ideal	point	 is	 from	her	own	subset	of	 ideal	points,	 left	or	right.	We	label	voting	decisions	that	are	
inconsistent	with	these	predictions	as	unexpected.22	Table	6	shows	the	observed	average	individual	
rate	of	unexpected	voting	for	each	treatment.	The	rate	of	each	participant	is	equally	weighted	and	
                                                            
22	Of	course,	unexpected	votes	never	occur	for	non‐candidates	in	No	Party	(who	are	predicted	to	vote	randomly)	nor	for	
elections	with	zero	or	one	entrant,	so	these	situations	are	excluded	from	the	analysis.	
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computed	by	dividing	her	number	of	unexpected	votes	by	the	number	of	cases	she	or	he	is	a	candidate	
respectively	nominee	or	non‐nominee.	As	can	be	seen,	candidates	and	nominees	do	indeed	mostly	
vote	for	themselves.	Specifically,	in	No	Party	(Party)	unexpected	votes	by	candidates	or	nominees	are	
observed	only	0.8	to	4.2	(0	to	3.5)	percent	of	the	time.	Similarly,	non‐nominees	in	Party	rarely	cast	
unexpected	votes	(only	2.0	to	6.5	percent	of	the	time).	Thus,	overall	voting	behavior	is	very	close	to	
BNE.	
Table	6:	Observed	unexpected	votes	
	 	
Average	individual	rates	of	
unexpected	votes	(std.	errors)	
n	 c	 Party
Candidates/	
Nominees	 Non‐nominees	
4	 10	 No .042	(.017) ‐	
4	 20	 No .026	(.015) ‐	
10	 10	 No .025	(.014) ‐	
10	 20	 No .008	(.004) ‐	
4	 10	 Yes .035	(.025) .052	(.020)	
4	 20	 Yes .007	(.007) .020	(.011)	
10	 10	 Yes .000	(.000) .057	(.018)	
10	 20	 Yes .000	(.000) .065	(.021)	
Note:	Elections	with	zero	or	one	entrant	are	excluded.	Non‐nominee’s	rates	are	for	the	Party	treatments	only.	
Standard	errors	are	computed	using	the	differences	in	each	individual’s	rate	and	the	average	individual	rate.	
Figure	5	displays	the	distribution	of	the	number	of	unexpected	votes	across	all	participants,	
with	 the	 number	 of	 such	 votes	 on	 the	 horizontal	 axis	 (from	 zero	 to	 the	 maximum	 observed	 of	
eighteen)	and	the	respective	fraction	of	individuals	on	the	vertical	axis.	The	figure	also	separates	out	
the	observations	 for	 independent	 candidates,	nominees,	 and	non‐nominees	as	 they	 face	different	
decision	 tasks.23	 The	diagonal	 axis	 shows	 combinations	 of	 party	mode	 and	 group	 size,	with	 data	
pooled	for	both	entry	costs.	The	figure	indicates	that	only	very	few	participants	voted	unexpectedly.	
Specifically,	77.8	and	82.5	percent	of	the	independent	candidates	in	4‐	and	10‐person	groups	always	
voted	as	predicted,	and	these	numbers	are	87.5	and	100	percent	for	nominees	and	71.9	and	57.5	
percent	for	non‐nominees,	respectively.	And	of	the	participants	who	cast	at	least	one	anomalous	vote,	
many	did	so	just	once	or	little	more	than	this.	Hence,	the	few	deviations	from	equilibrium	voting	are	
due	to	the	behavior	of	only	a	handful	of	the	participants	in	the	experiment.	For	example,	the	three	
largest	individual	counts	of	unexpected	votes	are	seventeen	by	a	candidate	in	ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ,	݊ ൌ 4ሻ	and	
                                                            
23	Compared	 to	nominees	 in	Party,	 there	 can	be	more	 than	 two	 contenders	 to	 choose	 from	by	 candidates	 in	No	Party,	
including	themselves.	And,	non‐nominees	 in	Party	must	realize	that	their	expected	payoff	 is	greater	 if	 they	vote	for	the	
contender	whose	ideal	point	is	from	the	same	direction	as	the	own	one,	while	nominees	simply	vote	for	themselves.	
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thirteen	 and	 eighteen	 by	 two	 non‐nominees	 in	ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ݊ ൌ 10ሻ,	 where	 the	 latter	 of	 them	 never	
entered.	
Figure	5:	Number	of	unexpected	votes	per	individual	
	
Note:	The	fractions	are	shown	per	independent	candidates,	nominees,	and	non‐nominees	and	are	pooled	for	
both	entry	cost	treatments,	so	the	figure	connects	only	the	party	mode	and	group	size.	
	
Next,	 we	 analyze	 whether	 the	 observed	 rates	 of	 unexpected	 voting	 depend	 on	 the	 ideal	
point.24	Figure	6	shows	the	rates	on	the	vertical	axis	and	the	absolute	distance	in	the	own	ideal	point	
and	the	closer	“median”	ideal	point,	50	or	51,	on	the	horizontal	axis.	Thus,	at	zero	on	the	horizontal	
axis	both	ideal	points	coincide	and	at	49	the	distance	between	them	is	maximal.	The	figure	shows	the	
data	 (lines	 with	 spikes)	 and	 respective	 logarithmic	 trend	 lines	 for	 candidates	 and	 nominees	
combined	 and	 for	 non‐nominees	 (thick	 black	 and	 gray	 lines,	 respectively),	 and	 also	 separate	
logarithmic	trends	for	candidates	and	nominees	(dashed	black	lines)	and	non‐nominees	who	did	and	
did	not	enter	(dashed	gray	 lines).	As	can	be	seen,	unexpected	voting	of	candidates	and	nominees	
doesn’t	 depend	 on	 the	 own	 ideal	 point	 (Spearman’s	ߩ ൌ െ0.018	 for	 both	 roles	 combined	 and	
െ0.037	and	 0.034	 for	 each	 role,	 respectively;	݌ ൒ 0.799)	 and	 is	 higher	 for	 candidates	 (but	 the	
difference	is	insignificant,	݌ ൌ 0.115,	individual	level	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon‐Mann‐Whitney	test,	fifteen	
and	four	participants	per	role).	
                                                            
24	The	following	analysis	pools	all	data	and	utilizes	only	participants	who	cast	at	least	one	unexpected	vote	in	the	entire	
session.	Using	instead	all	participants	in	the	nonparametric	tests	yields	many	ties	and	decreases	the	p‐values,	except	for	
two	increases	where	the	results	are	statistically	significant	whether	or	not	all	individuals	are	considered.	
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Figure	6:	Unexpected	voting	per	absolute	distance	in	own	and	median	ideal	points	
	
Note:	The	figure	depicts	unexpected	voting	rates	per	absolute	distance	in	own	and	median	ideal	points	for	non‐
nominees	and	for	candidates	and	nominees	combined.	At	zero,	the	own	ideal	point	is	50	or	51,	and	at	49	(50 െ
1	or	100 െ 51)	the	distance	is	maximal.	The	dashed	lines	show	the	respective	logarithmic	trends.	
By	contrast,	we	observe	a	negative	association	between	unexpected	voting	and	the	absolute	
distance	in	the	own	and	median	ideal	points	for	non‐nominees	(ߩ ൌ െ0.424	overall,	and	െ0.363	and	
െ0.352	 for	 entrants	 and	 non‐entrants;	݌ ൑ 0.012).	 In	 Party,	 note	 that	 anomalous	 voting	 of	 non‐
nominees	tends	to	be	smaller	when	they	entered	(݌ ൌ 0.006,	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon	signed‐ranks	test,	
25	individuals)	and	especially	high	for	ideal	points	within	about	ten	points	of	the	median.	Also,	the	
rates	 are	 always	 greater	 in	 the	 non‐nominee	 than	 nominee	 role	 (݌ ൌ 0.003,	 same	 test,	 26	
individuals).	Overall,	our	results	indicate	that	among	those	who	vote	unexpectedly,	candidates	and	
nominees	 make	 “plain”	 errors	 while	 for	 non‐nominees	 models	 that	 incorporate	 the	 pecuniary	
consequences	of	erroneous	voting	and	beliefs	about	nominee	ideal	points	seem	more	suitable.25	This	
also	makes	 sense,	 since	 the	expected	payoff‐maximizing	vote	 is	more	obvious	 for	 candidates	and	
nominees	 than	 for	 non‐nominees,26	 which	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 learning	 towards	 BNE	 voting	 of	
                                                            
25	For	example,	QRE	(McKelvey	and	Palfrey	1995,	1998)	allows	for	decision‐making	errors	and	thus	unexpected	voting.	It	
also	predicts	that	such	votes	get	more	frequent	the	nearer	an	ideal	point	is	to	50	or	51,	as	the	expected	policy	loss	if	someone	
else	is	elected	decreases	towards	the	median.	
26	Table	6	suggests	two	more	patterns	of	average	individual	rates	of	unexpected	voting	for	primary	comparisons.	First,	the	
rates	are	always	weakly	greater	with	a	lower	than	larger	entry	cost	for	candidates	and	nominees	(݌ ൌ 0.035,	one‐tailed	
Wilcoxon	signed‐ranks	test	for	both	roles	combined,	eighteen	individuals),	but	no	pattern	is	seen	for	non‐nominees	(albeit,	
݌ ൌ 0.074	in	favor	of	greater	rates	with	a	lower	cost,	same	test,	26	individuals).	Second,	the	rates	are	always	greater	in	
smaller	than	larger	groups	for	candidates	and	nominees	(݌ ൌ 0.029,	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon‐Mann‐Whitney	test,	twelve	and	
seven	individuals	in	4‐	and	10‐person	groups,	respectively),	and	the	reverse	is	seen	for	non‐nominees	(but	the	difference	
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participants	in	the	latter	role:	while	unexpected	voting	doesn’t	depend	on	the	period	for	candidates	
and	nominees	combined	using	all	60	periods	or	the	first	and	last	30	periods	only	(Spearman’s	ߩ ൌ
െ0.112,	െ0.247,	and	െ0.029;	݌ ൒ 0.188),	it	does	so	negatively	for	non‐nominees	for	all	60	and	last	
30	periods	(ߩ ൌ െ0.312	and	െ0.378;	݌ ൌ 0.093	and	0.003,	respectively)	but	not	the	first	30	periods	
(ߩ ൌ െ0.159, ݌ ൌ 0.402).	
7.2.	Individual	entry	behavior	
Here	 we	 present	 individual	 level	 data	 of	 entry	 behavior.	 Figure	 7	 depicts	 cumulative	
frequency	 distributions	 of	 actual	 average	 individual	 entry	 rates	 for	 ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	
and	ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 20, ݊ ൌ 10ሻ,	which	have	with	݌௘௠௣∗ ൌ 0.844	and	0.152	the	most	extreme	BNE	entry		
Figure	7:	Cumulative	distribution	of	individual	entry	rates	(for	lowest	and	highest	BNE	entry)	
	
	
probabilities.	 The	 distributions	 of	 the	 six	 other	 treatments	 tend	 to	 fall	 within	 these	 two	
distributions.27	Clearly,	there	is	marked	heterogeneity	in	entry	rates	among	participants.	Further,	the	
50	percent	horizontal	line	intersects	the	two	distributions	in	the	expected	order,	but	more	to	the	left	
and	right	relative	to	݌௘௠௣∗ ൌ 0.844	and	0.152,	respectively.	This	is	consistent	with	QRE,	which	pulls	
the	entry	rates	away	from	BNE	towards	1/2.	
The	scatter	plot	in	Figure	8	shows,	for	each	participant,	the	average	entry	rate	with	ܿ ൌ 10	
and	 20	 points	 on	 the	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 axis,	 respectively.	 Each	 marker	 represents	 one	
                                                            
is	 not	 significant,	 ݌ ൌ 0.241,	same	 test,	 nine	 and	 seventeen	 individuals).	 Finally,	 for	 the	 two	 possible	 within‐subject	
comparisons,	unexpected	voting	is	neither	associated	between	both	entry	costs	for	candidates	and	nominees	combined	and	
for	non‐nominees	nor	between	the	nominee	and	non‐nominee	roles	in	Party	(Spearman’s	ߩ ൌ െ0.026,	0.105,	and	0.058;	
݌ ൒ 0.611).	Due	to	few	unexpected	votes	by	few	individuals,	all	these	findings	are	hard	to	interpret	as	we	would	need	to	
control	for,	say,	ideal	points	and	expected	payoffs.	
27	See	Figure	B3	in	Appendix	B.	The	cumulative	distributions	of	entry	rates	of	ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	and	ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ
10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	intersect	once.	
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individual,	where	different	symbols	indicate	different	combinations	of	the	party	mode	and	group	size	
(a	 few	markers	are	somewhat	magnified	 in	proportion	to	 the	number	of	 individuals	at	 that	same	
coordinate).	As	expected,	independent	of	party	mode	and	group	size,	most	individuals	enter	more	
often	when	 it	 costs	 less	 (i.e.,	have	markers	below	 the	diagonal;	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon	signed	ranks	
tests,	݌ ൏ 0.001	for	each	party	mode	and	group	size	combination).	Specifically,	only	28	out	of	all	148	
participants	entered	more	often	with	a	larger	cost,	and	most	of	them	are	found	close	to	the	diagonal.	
Also,	 fourteen	 participants	 have	 the	 same	 entry	 rates	with	 both	 costs	 (i.e.,	 with	markers	 on	 the	
diagonal),	of	whom	one	never	entered	and	six	always	entered.	
	
Figure	8:	Entry	cost	effect	
	
Note:	Each	participant’s	average	entry	rate	with	ܿ ൌ 10	and	20	points	is	shown	on	the	horizontal	and	vertical	
axis,	respectively.	Each	marker	represents	one	participant,	where	a	few	markers	are	somewhat	magnified	in	
proportion	to	the	number	of	individuals	at	that	coordinate.	
Next,	we	explore	the	extent	to	which	observed	entry	decisions	are	consistent	with	cutpoint	
strategies,	which	are	generally	optimal	best	responses	in	this	game.	Specifically,	for	each	participant	
݅	 and	 treatment	݄	 we	 estimate	 a	 cutpoint	 pair	 as	 follows,	 assuming	 that	 individuals	 use	 such	 a	
decision	rule.	For	each	participant	and	treatment,	we	have	ݐ ൌ 30	periods	or	observational	pairs	of	
an	ideal	point	and	entry	decision,	ሺݔ௜,௧, ݁௜,௧ሻ௛.	Fixing	a	cutpoint	pair	ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ௜,௛,	with	1 ൑ ුݔ௟ ൑ 50	and	
ුݔ௥ ൌ 101 െ ුݔ௟	due	to	symmetry,	observation	ݐ	in	treatment	݄	is	marked	consistent	with	this	cutpoint	
pair	if	
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ሺ݅ሻ	ුݔ௟,௜ ൏ ݔ௜,௧ ൏ ුݔ௥,௜ 	and	݁௜,௧ ൌ 0,	or	
ሺ݅݅ሻ	ݔ௜,௧ ൑ 	 ුݔ௟,௜ 		⋁			ුݔ௥,௜ ൑ ݔ௜,௧	and	݁௜,௧ ൌ 1,	
and	marked	as	error	otherwise.28	And,	as	an	estimator	of	participant	݅’s	cutpoint	pair	we	choose	the	
one	that	minimizes	the	total	number	of	errors,	and	if	there	are	more	such	pairs	we	take	the	average	
of	them.	Using	this	procedure,	we	compute	the	distribution	of	individual	classification	error	rates	and	
cumulative	frequency	distributions	of	estimated	individual	cutpoint	pairs.	
Figure	9:	Distribution	of	classification	error	rates	
		Note:	Individual	error	rates	are	pooled	for	both	entry	costs.	
	
	
Figure	9	depicts	the	overall	distribution	of	individual	error	rates,	which	are	pooled	for	both	
entry	costs.	For	about	25	(50;	75)	percent	of	the	participants	the	error	rate	is	൑ 0.1	(0.2;	0.3),	and	
only	three	percent	have	error	rates	of	0.4	or	higher	but	none	reaches	the	0.5.	Figure	10	shows	the	
cumulative	 distributions	 of	 estimated	 individual	 cutpoint	 pairs	 for	 ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	 and	
ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 20, ݊ ൌ 10ሻ,	which	have	 the	most	moderate	 and	most	 extreme	BNE	 cutpoint	 pairs	 of	
ሾ42, 59ሿ	and	ሾ8, 93ሿ,	respectively.	Due	to	symmetry	we	only	show	the	left	cutpoints,	superimposing	
the	 data	 from	 both	 directions.29	 There	 is	marked	 heterogeneity	 among	 the	 estimated	 individual	
cutpoint	pairs.	Finally,	the	50	percent	horizontal	line	and	two	distributions	intersect	in	the	expected	
order,	and	close	to	the	eight	and	somewhat	closer	to	the	median	than	the	42	predicted,	respectively.	
	
                                                            
28	A	citizen’s	discrete	ideal	point	matches	a	cutpoint	with	strictly	positive	probability	and,	for	our	parameters,	in	equilibrium	
she	can	raise	her	expected	payoff	by	entering.	By	contrast,	Großer	and	Palfrey	(2014)	use	continuous	types	so	a	citizen	
located	at	a	cutpoint,	which	almost	surely	never	occurs,	is	indifferent	between	entering	and	not	entering	and	assumed	to	
enter.	
29The	distributions	of	the	other	six	treatments	fall	within	these	two	distributions.	See	Figure	4B	in	Appendix	B.		
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Figure	10:	Cumulative	distributions	of	individual	cutpoint	pairs	(for	lowest	and	highest	BNE	entry)	
	
Note:	Due	to	symmetry,	we	only	present	the	left	cutpoints,	superimposing	the	data	from	both	directions.	
Table	7	 gives	 the	 fraction	of	 average	 individual	positive	differences	 in	 the	estimated	 “left	
cutpoint	with	ܿ ൌ 10	points	minus	left	cutpoint	with	ܿ ൌ 20	points.”	The	fraction	ranges	from	0.58	to	
0.78,	compared	to	1	in	BNE,	and	average	differences	range	from	4.27	to	8.64	(in	brackets).	
Table	7:	Fraction	(average)	of	positive	individual	cutpoint	differences	
	 Left	cutpoint		ܿ ൌ 10			left	cutpoint	ܿ ൌ 20
	 No	Party Party
݊ ൌ 4	 0.61	(8.64) 0.60	(6.66)
݊ ൌ 10	 0.78	(8.77) 0.58	(4.27)
Note:	Party	with	݊ ൌ 10	has	two	individuals	with	zero	difference,	and	each	of	the	other	three	combinations	of	
the	party	mode	and	group	size	has	one	individual	with	zero	difference.	
Overall,	participants	do	not	follow	sharp	cutpoint	strategies.	While	this	is	inconsistent	with	
optimizing	behavior	and	with	BNE,	it	is	very	much	in	line	with	the	behavioral	theory	behind	regular	
QRE.	 Participants	 in	 this	 experiment	 do	 not	 always	 optimize,	 but	 generally	 choose	 better	 entry	
actions	more	often	than	worse	ones.	This	is	also	very	much	in	line	with	results	from	cutpoint	analysis	
in	binary	choice	turnout	games	(Levine	and	Palfrey	2007),	where	the	vote/abstain	choice	is	similar	
in	nature	to	enter/not	enter.	
8.	Conclusions	
This	paper	reports	a	laboratory	study	of	a	citizen‐candidate	entry	game	with	incomplete	information	
about	 the	 ideal	 points	 of	 citizens	 and	 candidates.	 Ideal	 points	 are	privately	 observed	 iid	 random	
draws	 from	 a	 uniform	distribution	 over	 the	 set	 of	 feasible	 common	policies.	Without	 ideological	
political	parties,	citizens	have	no	extra	information	about	the	ideal	points	of	independent	candidates	
at	 the	 time	of	 voting.	 By	 contrast,	with	parties	 they	 learn	whether	 a	party	nominee’s	 ideal	 point	
belongs	to	the	left	or	right	half	of	the	common	policy	set,	but	not	her	exact	ideal	point.	The	study	
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compares	both	party	modes	in	4‐	or	10‐person	groups	and	with	two	different	entry	costs.	In	the	entry	
game,	 symmetric	 BNE	makes	 sharp	 and	mostly	 unique	 predictions	 of	 cutpoint	 pairs.	 That	 is,	 in	
equilibrium	each	citizen	with	an	ideal	point	at	or	more	extreme	than	a	left	or	right	cutpoint	runs	for	
office,	while	everyone	with	an	ideal	point	strictly	in	between	the	two	cutpoints	doesn’t	run.	Thus,	the	
model	predicts	political	polarization	in	the	sense	that	the	ideal	points	of	politicians	are	more	extreme	
than	those	in	the	general	polity.	Finally,	the	clear	distributional	BNE	entry	predictions,	from	which	
we	also	derive	implications	about	welfare,	have	the	advantage	of	being	straightforward	to	test	in	the	
laboratory.	
	 The	main	experimental	results	can	be	summarized	as	follows.	First,	all	primary	comparative	
statics	predictions	of	entry	rates	and	economic	welfare	are	supported	by	the	data.	Most	importantly,	
inefficient	 political	 polarization	 arises	 in	 all	 treatments.	 Second,	 participants	 appear	 to	 follow	
cutpoint	strategies	with	some	error,	and	the	distribution	of	estimated	cutpoints	indicate	significant	
heterogeneity.	Consequently,	instead	of	step	functions,	actual	entry	rates	are	U‐shaped		functions	of	
the	ideal	points	in	all	treatments,	with	over‐entry	when	the	BNE	entry	probability	is	smaller	than	50	
percent	 and	 (weak)	 under‐entry	 when	 it	 is	 greater	 than	 50	 percent.	 Because	 participants	 with	
moderate	ideal	points	sometimes	enter	and	win,	we	observe	less	political	polarization	and	thus	on	
average	a	smaller	total	policy	loss	and	greater	economic	welfare	than	predicted	(with	over‐entry,	the	
greater	 total	 expense	 is	 exceeded	 by	 the	 smaller	 policy	 loss).	 The	 primary	 comparative	 static	
predictions	of	logit	QRE	are	all	supported	in	the	data,	as	they	are	the	same	as	those	of	BNE,	but	in	
addition	QRE	 tracks	 the	 levels	 and	 patterns	 of	 entry	 and	welfare	much	 better.	 Third,	 ideological	
parties	lead	to	more	polarization,	but	at	the	same	time	alleviate	some	of	the	inefficiencies	caused	by	
extreme	 policies	 because	 knowledge	 of	 a	 nominee’s	 party	 affiliation	 enables	 implicit	 vote	
coordination	in	favor	of	the	majority,	which	is	more	likely	to	win	than	in	the	absence	of	parties.	
	 Overall,	this	study	shows	empirically	that	incomplete	information	in	elections	can	indeed	lead	
to	inefficient	political	polarization	through	the	informational	effects	on	entry.	In	order	to	check	the	
robustness	of	our	findings,	future	research	could	for	example	examine	various	different	distributions	
of	ideal	points	(e.g.,	asymmetric	distributions)	and	default	policies.	Another	interesting	direction	is	
to	 compare	 different	 voting	 systems	 (e.g.,	 Bol,	 Dellis,	 and	 Oak,	 forthcoming)	 and	 to	 study	more	
explicitly	the	formation	of	parties	and	how	they	select	their	nominees,	such	as	via	primaries	(e.g.,	
Hansen	2014).	We	hope	that	these	findings	may	inspire	further	theoretical	and	empirical	work	to	
shed	more	 light	 on	 the	 non‐trivial,	 realistic	 political	 processes	 such	 as	 those	 explored	 in	 citizen‐
candidate	entry	games.	
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Appendix	A:	Theoretical	Derivations	
Best	response	entry	strategies	
Consider	our	citizen‐candidate	entry	game	without	parties	and	with	a	discrete,	uniform	cumulative	
probability	function	of	ideal	points	ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ݔ/100,	ݔ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ	and	density	݂ሺݔሻ ൌ 1/100.	If	all	
citizens	݆ ് ݅	are	using	cutpoint	strategy	(cf.	ሺ2ሻ	in	the	main	text)	
݁̌௝ ൌ ቊ
0 ݂݅ ݔ௝ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽ
1 ݂݅ ݔ௝ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽ ∪ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽ,
																																														 ሺܣ1ሻ	
then	the	expected	payoff	of	a	citizen	type	ݔ௜	for	entering	the	political	competition,	݁̌௜ ൌ 1,	is	given	by	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵܾ																																																																																																																													ሺܣ2ሻ
൅ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
݌௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ ൥ܾ݉ െ
݉ െ 1
݉ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩ െ ܿ	
and	her	expected	payoff	from	not	entering,	݁̌௜ ൌ 0,	by	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൥ܾ݊ െ
݊ െ 1
݊ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩																																					ሺܣ3ሻ
െ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
݌௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ.	
The	expected	policy	loss	terms	ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻሿ	and	ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻሿ	are	specified	in	ሺ4ሻ	and	ሺ5ሻ	in	the	main	
text,	respectively.	Relating	ሺܣ1ሻ	and	ሺܣ2ሻ	and	rearranging	yields	the	best	response	entry	strategy	ሺ3ሻ	
in	the	main	text.	
With	parties,	if	all	citizens	݆ ് ݅	are	using	cutpoint	strategy	ሺܣ1ሻ,	then	the	expected	payoff	of	
a	 citizen	 type	ݔ௜	 in	 the	Right	Party	 for	entering	 the	political	 competition,	 ݁̌௜ ൌ 1,	 is	 given	by	 (and	
analogous	for	a	citizen	in	the	Left	Party)	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵܾ																																																																																																																													ሺܣ4ሻ	
									൅ ෍ ൬ ݊ െ 1݉௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ቀ݌2ቁ
௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ೝ ൥ ܾ݉௥ െ
݉௥ െ 1
݉௥ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൩																
൅ ෍ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉௟ ൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ିଵ
௠೗ୀଵ
ቀ݌2ቁ
௠೗ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠೗ିଵ ൬݊ െ݉௟ െ 1݇ ൰ ൬
1
2൰
௡ି௠೗ିଵ
																																											
ൈ ൣߩ௥ܾ െ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ൧	
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and	her	expected	payoff	from	not	entering,	݁̌௜ ൌ 0,	is	given	by	
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The	three	expected	policy	loss	terms	ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, . ሻሿ	with	parties	are	specified	in	ሺ7ሻ	to	ሺ9ሻ	and	the	win	
probability	of	the	Right	Party,	ߩ௥,	is	described	on	p.	10	in	the	main	text.	Then,	relating	both	conditions	
and	rearranging	yields	the	best	response	entry	strategy	ሺ6ሻ	in	the	main	text.	
Average	expected	welfare	
Without	parties,	 the	ex‐ante	(i.e.,	before	citizen	 ideal	points	are	randomly	drawn),	 the	average	or	
expected	individual	payoff	ߨ௘ ൌ భ೙∑ ߨ௘,௜௡௜ୀଵ 	is	given	by	
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and	with	parties	it	is	given	by	
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where	ߩ௟ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠೗ା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	is	the	Left	Party’s	probability	of	winning	and	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
.	
QRE	entry	conditions	
Here,	 we	 derive	 the	 logit	 QRE	 conditions	 of	 entry	 probabilities,	 allowing	 for	 erroneous	 binary	
decisions	at	each	ideal	point	ݔ ∈ ሼ1,2, … 100ሽ.	If	ߣ ൌ 0,	then	each	citizen	type	ݔ	makes	purely	random	
decisions	(i.e.,	enters	with	probability	one‐half).	If	ߣ ൎ ∞,	then	everyone	follows	the	BNE	cutpoint	
strategy.	Since	there	are	one‐hundred	different	citizen	types	ݔ,	we	must	simultaneously	solve	one‐
hundred	conditions.	Without	parties,	the	QRE	condition	for	a	citizen	type	ݔ௜	is	given	by	
ݍ௫೔ ൌ
1
1 ൅ ݁ିఒ௏ሺ௫೔,௤ሬԦೣሻ .																																																																		ሺܣ8ሻ	
The	LHS	gives	her	entry	probability	ݍ௫೔	and	on	RHS	ݍԦ௫	denotes	the	vector	of	entry	probabilities	of	all	
feasible	types	ݔ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ	that	every	other	citizen	݆ ് ݅	may	possess.	Since	ideal	points	are	iid	
random	draws	 from	a	uniform	distribution,	 each	ݔ	occurs	with	probability	1/100	so	 the	average	
entry	probability	of	each	other	citizen	݆	is	given	by	
ݍ ൌ 1100෍ݍ௫
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
.																																																																					ሺܣ9ሻ	
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	 Further,	RHS	contains	citizen	݅’s	expected	net	payoff	from	entering	(cf.	ሺ3ሻ	in	the	main	text),	
which	is	given	by	
ܸሺݔ௜, ݍԦ௫ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݍሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ሼ1,… ,100ሽሿ൧																																																												ሺܣ10ሻ	
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ଵ଴଴
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																													ሺܣ11ሻ	
and	
ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ ൌ 1ݍ෍ݍ௫
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100
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀଵ
,																																							ሺܣ12ሻ	
where	the	expected	policy	losses	ሺܣ11ሻ	and	ሺܣ12ሻ	account	for	all	feasible	ideal	points	of	others	(i.e.,	
not	just	those	of	the	more	extreme	entrants	as	dictated	by	the	BNE	cutpoint	pair).	
Then,	 for	 a	 given	 ߣ	 the	 one‐hundred	 equilibrium	 conditions	 of	 the	 form	 ሺܣ8ሻ	 are	
simultaneously	solved	for	ݔ ൌ 1,… ,100		to	determine	the	QRE	vector	of	entry	probabilities,	ݍԦ௫ఒ.	
Next,	with	parties	we	need	to	distinguish	between	entrants	 from	the	Left	 and	Right	Party,	
respectively,	 so	 we	 replace	 the	 average	 entry	 probability	 of	 each	 other	 citizen	݆	 ሺܣ9ሻ	 by	 the	
probabilities	that	݆	enters	from	the	left	or	right	direction,	respectively:	
ݍ௟ ൌ 150෍ݍ௫																																																																							ሺܣ13ሻ
ହ଴
௫ୀଵ
	
and	
ݍ௥ ൌ 150 ෍ ݍ௫,
ଵ଴଴
௫ୀହଵ
																																																																					ሺܣ14ሻ	
where	the	average	individual	entry	probability	is	
ݍ ൌ ݍ௟ ൅ ݍ௥.																																																																									ሺܣ15ሻ	
	 The	RHS	of	ሺܣ8ሻ	contains	citizen	݅’s	expected	net	payoff	 from	entering	(cf.	ሺ6ሻ	 in	the	main	
text),	which	for	a	right	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ51,… ,100ሽ		is	given	by	(and	similar	for	a	left	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽ)	
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and	
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																																							ሺܣ19ሻ	
where	he	expected	policy	losses	ሺܣ17ሻ	to	ሺܣ18ሻ	account	for	all	feasible	ideal	points	of	others,	and	
ߩ௥ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠ೝା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	gives	the	win	probability	of	the	Right	Party	with	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
.	Then,	
for	a	given	ߣ	 the	one‐hundred	equilibrium	conditions	of	 the	 form	ሺܣ8ሻ	are	simultaneously	solved	
for	ݔ ൌ 1, … ,100		to	determine	the	QRE	vector	of	entry	probabilities,	ݍԦ௫ఒ.	
Figure	A1:	QRE	distributions	of	entry	probabilities	‐	Example	
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Appendix	B:	Supplementary	Tables	and	Figures	
	
Table	B1:	Entry	rates	‐	Predictions	and	data	
n	 c	 Party ݌௢௕௦	 		݌∗	(݌௘௠௣∗ ) ݌ఒ෡	(݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ )	
4	 10	 No .687 .840	(.844) .603	(.602)	
4	 10	 Yes .673 .680	(.671) .569	(.570)	
4	 20	 No .560 .400	(.417) .457	(.459)	
4	 20	 Yes .496 .340	(.364) .434	(.436)	
10	 10	 No .519 .420	(.426) .465	(.465)	
10	 10	 Yes .445 .280	(.256) .424	(.423)	
10	 20	 No .426 .200	(.181) .331	(.330)	
10	 20	 Yes .321 .160	(.152) .303	(.302)	
Note:	Standard	errors	of	݌௢௕௦	are	all	in	the	range	ሾ.013, .016ሿ.	BNE	is	indicated	by	an	asterisk	and	QRE	by	ߣመ,	the	
maximum	likelihood	estimate	of	the	degree	of	error.	
	
Table	B2:	Average	payoffs	–	Predictions	and	data		
n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 				ߨ௘∗				(ߨ௘௠௣∗ )	 						ߨ௘ఒ෡				(ߨ௘௠௣ఒ෡ )	
4	 10	 No	 69.26 66.98 (67.00) 69.91	(70.67)	
4	 10	 Yes	 70.42 69.09	(69.06) 71.96	(72.14)	
4	 20	 No	 64.22 64.59 (64.00) 66.65 (66.95)	
4	 20	 Yes	 68.03 66.69	(66.56) 68.41	(68.73)	
10	 10	 No	 64.44 59.71 (60.28) 65.45	(65.01)	
10	 10	 Yes	 68.31 61.24	(63.98) 68.36 (68.31)	
10	 20	 No	 62.61 57.59 (59.25) 63.20	(63.24)	
10	 20	 Yes	 64.35 59.90 (61.89) 65.94 (65.91)	
Note:	Standard	errors	for	ߨത௢௕௦	are	in	the	range	ሾ.71, .82ሿ.	
	
Table	B3:	Average	payoffs,	policy	losses,	and	entry	expenses	–	Predictions	and	data		
Treatment	 Payoffs	 Policy	losses	 Entry	expenses	 Bonus	
n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ߨത௘௠௣∗ 	 ߨത௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	 ̅ݒ௢௕௦	 ̅ݒ௘௠௣∗ 	 ̅ݒ௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	 ݌௢௕௦ܿ ݌௘௠௣∗ ܿ ݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ ܿ	 ܾ/݊
4	 10	 No	 69.26	 67.00	 70.67 25.12 25.81 24.55 6.87 8.44	 6.02 1.25
4	 10	 Yes	 70.42	 69.06	 72.14 24.10 25.48 23.41 6.73 6.71	 5.70 1.25
4	 20	 No	 64.22	 64.00	 66.95 25.83 28.91 25.12 11.20 8.33	 9.18 1.25
4	 20	 Yes	 68.03	 66.56	 68.73 23.30 27.42 23.81 9.92 7.27	 8.71 1.25
10	 10	 No	 64.44	 60.28	 65.01 30.87 35.96 30.84 5.19			 4.26	 4.65 0.50
10	 10	 Yes	 68.31	 63.98	 68.31 27.74 33.96 27.96 4.45 2.56	 4.23 0.50
10	 20	 No	 62.61	 59.25	 63.24 29.38 37.63 30.66 8.52 3.62	 6.60 0.50
10	 20	 Yes	 64.35	 61.89	 65.91 29.74 35.58 28.56 6.42 3.03	 6.04 0.50
Note:	Standard	errors	for	ߨത௢௕௦	are	in	the	range	ሾ.71, .82ሿ,	and	for	̅ݒ௢௕௦	and	݌௢௕௦ܿ	they	are	in	the	range	ሾ.69, .80ሿ	
and	ሾ.13, .34ሿ,	respectively.	
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Table	B4:	Observed	average	payoffs,	policy	losses,	and	entry	expenses	of	leaders	and	non‐leaders	
Leader	 n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ̅ݒ௢௕௦	 ݌௢௕௦ܿ	 ܾ	
No	
4	 10	 No 60.65	 33.49 5.86	 ‐	
4	 10	 Yes 62.23	 32.13 5.64	 ‐	
4	 20	 No 57.19	 34.44 8.37	 ‐	
4	 20	 Yes 61.88	 31.07 7.06	 ‐	
10	 10	 No 61.04	 34.30 4.66			 ‐	
10	 10	 Yes 65.34	 30.82 3.84	 ‐	
10	 20	 No 60.12	 32.64 7.24	 ‐	
10	 20	 Yes 62.00	 33.04 4.96	 ‐	
Yes	
4	 10	 No 95.11	 0 9.89	 5	
4	 10	 Yes 95.00	 0 10.00	 5	
4	 20	 No 85.30	 0 19.70	 5	
4	 20	 Yes 86.50	 0 18.50	 5	
10	 10	 No 95.00	 0 10.00			 5	
10	 10	 Yes 95.08	 0 9.92	 5	
10	 20	 No 85.00	 0 20.00	 5	
10	 20	 Yes 85.50	 0 19.50	 5	
Note:	 For	 non‐leaders,	 standard	 errors	 of	ߨത௢௕௦,	̅ݒ௢௕௦,	 and	 ݌௢௕௦ܿ	 are	 in	 the	 range	ሾ. 74, .98ሿ, ሾ. 70, .89ሿ,	 and	
ሾ.15, .36ሿ,	respectively.	For	leaders,	standard	errors	of	ߨത௢௕௦	and	݌௢௕௦ܿ	are	both	in	the	range	ሾ.00, .34ሿ.	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	B1:	Entry	rates	per	ideal	points	for	normalized	distances	to	median	ideal	point	–	
Predictions	and	data	
	
41 
 
	
	
	
	
	
42 
 
Figure	B2:	Frequency	of	participants	with	ideal	points	ሼ51, … ,100ሽ	
	
Figure	B3:	Cumulative	frequency	distributions	of	average	individual	entry	rates	
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Figure	B4:	Cumulative	frequency	distributions	of	estimated	individual	cutpoint	pairs	
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Online	supporting	material	
Sample	Instructions	(Party,	݊ ൌ 4,	ܿ ൌ 10)	
Instructions	
Thank	you	 for	agreeing	to	participate	 in	this	decision‐making	experiment.	You	will	receive	$7	for	
participating,	plus	additional	earnings	during	the	experiment	that	depend	on	your	own	decisions,	the	
decisions	of	others,	and	chance.	Your	earnings	in	the	experiment	are	expressed	in	points.	250	points	
are	worth	$1.	At	 the	 end	of	 the	experiment,	 your	 total	 earnings	 in	points	will	 be	 exchanged	 into	
dollars	and	paid	to	you	in	cash.	No	other	participant	will	be	informed	about	your	payment!	
Please	switch	off	your	cellphone,	remain	quiet,	and	do	not	communicate	with	other	participants	during	
the	entire	experiment!	Raise	your	hand	if	you	have	any	questions,	and	one	of	us	will	come	to	you	to	
answer	them.	
	
Parts	and	Decision	Rounds	
The	experiment	consists	of	two	parts,	labeled	Part	1	and	Part	2.	Each	part	has	30	decision	rounds.	We	
will	read	you	the	instructions	for	Part	1	now.	After	completing	Part	1	we	will	read	instructions	for	
Part	2.	
	
Instructions	Part	1	
Your	Group	
At	the	beginning	of	each	round,	all	participants	will	be	randomly	divided	into	groups	of	4.	Thus,	in	
addition	to	yourself,	there	will	be	three	other	members	in	your	group.	Note	that	you	will	not	know	
who	these	other	members	are.	Also,	please	note	that	the	groups	are	completely	independent	of	each	
other.	In	any	particular	round	you	will	have	no	interaction	at	all	with	participants	in	the	other	groups.	
	
Group	Decision	Problem	
In	each	round,	your	group	will	decide	on	a	group	outcome,	which	can	be	any	integer	between	1	and	
100.	This	is	done	by	electing	a	group	leader,	whose	best	outcome	will	be	implemented	as	the	group	
outcome.	Each	of	you	will	be	told	what	your	own	best	outcome	is	in	that	round,	and	different	group	
members	will	generally	have	different	best	outcomes.	You	receive	the	highest	benefits	if	the	group	
outcome	equals	your	own	best	outcome,	and	receive	lower	benefits	the	further	the	group	outcome	is	
from	your	own	best	outcome.	We	will	explain	the	exact	payoff	details	shortly.	
	
Random	Assignment	of	Best	Outcomes	
How	is	your	own	best	outcome	assigned	in	a	round?	This	is	done	by	the	computer.	It	will	randomly	
assign	each	member	in	your	group	a	best	outcome	by	choosing	one	of	the	integers	from	1	to	100,	with	
each	integer	being	equally	likely.	The	computer	does	this	completely	independently	for	each	group	
member,	so	typically	different	members	will	each	have	a	different	best	outcome.	You	are	only	told	
your	own	best	outcome.	You	are	not	told	the	best	outcome	of	any	other	group	member.	Therefore,	
knowing	your	own	best	outcome	gives	you	no	 information	whatsoever	about	anybody	else’s	best	
outcome.	All	you	know	about	another	group	member’s	best	outcome	is	that	it	is	some	integer	from	1	
to	 100,	 with	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 being	 any	 of	 those	 integers.	 Importantly,	 best	 outcomes	 are	
reassigned	independently	in	each	round,	so	your	own	best	outcome	will	typically	vary	from	round	to	
round,	 and	 your	past	 assigned	best	 outcomes	have	nothing	 to	do	with	 your	 future	 assigned	best	
outcomes.	
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Low	Number	and	High	Number	Members	
If	your	best	outcome	 is	50	or	 less,	 then	we	refer	 to	you	as	a	“Low	number”	member.	 If	your	best	
outcome	is	51	or	greater,	then	we	refer	to	you	as	a	“High	number”	member.	The	same	holds	for	the	
other	members	in	your	group.	
	
Decision‐Making	Stages	
Each	round	consists	of	two	decision‐making	stages,	labeled	Stage	1	and	Stage	2.	
Stage	1	
Each	group	member	will	decide	on	whether	or	not	to	enter	as	a	candidate	in	the	upcoming	election	
for	group	leader	of	the	current	round.	Whoever	will	become	the	group	leader	receives	a	bonus	of	5	
points.	However,	if	you	choose	to	enter	as	a	candidate	for	leadership,	then	you	must	pay	an	entry	fee	
of	10	points.	If	you	choose	not	to	enter,	then	you	do	not	pay	any	fee	(0	points).	The	winner	of	the	
election	will	be	the	group	leader,	and	the	group	outcome	coincides	with	her	or	his	best	outcome.	
Stage	2	
In	 this	 stage,	 if	more	 than	 one	 low	 number	member	 entered	 in	 Stage	 1,	 then	 the	 computer	will	
randomly	select	one	of	them	for	the	election	with	an	equal	chance	for	each.	This	selected	member	is	
called	“Low	Number	Candidate.”	Similarly,	if	more	than	one	high	number	member	entered	in	Stage	
1,	then	the	computer	will	randomly	select	one	of	them	for	the	election	with	an	equal	chance	for	each.	
This	selected	member	is	called	“High	Number	Candidate.”	Each	group	member	casts	a	single	vote	for	
exactly	one	candidate.	The	candidates	are	indicated	on	the	computer	screen,	represented	by	decision	
buttons	 labeled	with	 their	member	 ID	 label	 letter	 and	whether	 they	 are	 from	 Low	 or	 High.	 For	
example,	if	member	X	and	member	Q	are	the	respective	low	and	high	number	candidates,	then	there	
will	be	two	decision	buttons	with	labels	“Low	Number	Candidate	X”	and	“High	Number	Candidate	Q”,	
respectively.	If	no	low	(high)	number	member	entered	in	Stage	1,	then	there	is	no	low	(high)	number	
candidate.	
	
Each	group	member,	whether	a	candidate	or	not,	then	votes	for	one	of	the	candidates	by	clicking	on	
the	respective	decision	button,	possibly	for	her‐	or	himself.	If	you	are	a	candidate	yourself,	then	the	
label	on	your	decision	button	is	highlighted	in	red.	The	candidate	with	the	most	votes	in	your	group	is	
the	elected	group	leader.	If	the	candidates	have	the	same	number	of	votes,	then	one	of	them	will	be	
randomly	selected	as	the	group	leader,	with	an	equal	chance	for	each.	
	
Special	case:	If	no	group	member	entered	as	a	candidate	in	Stage	1,	then	there	is	no	voting.	Instead,	
one	of	the	four	group	members	will	be	randomly	selected	as	the	group	leader,	with	an	equal	chance	
for	each.	Please	note	that	this	randomly	selected	group	leader	does	not	pay	the	entry	fee	(because	
she	or	he	actually	did	not	enter)	but	nonetheless	still	receives	the	leader	bonus	of	5	points	and	the	
group	outcome	equals	her	or	his	best	outcome.	
	
It	is	important	to	remember	that	the	group	outcome	is	always	exactly	equal	to	the	best	outcome	of	
the	 group	 leader,	 regardless	 of	whether	 she	 or	he	 entered	 and	won	 the	 election	 or	was	 selected	
randomly	after	nobody	entered.	
	
Your	Round	Earnings	
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Your	round	earnings	will	depend	on	three	factors:	the	distance	between	your	own	best	outcome	and	
the	group	outcome,	whether	you	chose	to	enter	the	election	as	a	candidate,	and	whether	you	are	the	
group	leader.	There	are	only	four	possibilities:	
	
(i)	You	were	a	candidate	but	not	elected	to	be	group	leader	
In	this	case,	your	round	earnings	equal	“100	points	minus	the	absolute	distance	between	your	own	
best	outcome	and	the	group	outcome,	minus	the	10	points	entry	fee”	or:	
ܻ݋ݑݎ	ݎ݋ݑ݊݀	݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	ሺܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁, ܾݑݐ	݊݋ݐ	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎሻ	
ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| െ 10.	
Example:	Your	own	best	outcome	is	60,	and	the	group	outcome	is	91,	then	your	round	earnings	are	
100 െ |60 െ 91| െ 10 ൌ 59	points.	
(ii)	You	were	a	candidate	and	elected	to	be	group	leader	
In	this	case,	your	round	earnings	are	equal	to	exactly	95	points,	or:	
ܻ݋ݑݎ	ݎ݋ݑ݊݀	݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	ሺܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁	ܽ݊݀	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎሻ	
ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| ൅ 5 െ 10	
ൌ 100 െ 0 ൅ 5 െ 10 ൌ 95.	
(iii)	You	were	not	a	candidate	and	were	not	the	group	leader	
In	this	case,	your	round	earnings	equal	“100	points	minus	the	absolute	distance	between	your	own	
best	outcome	and	the	group	outcome”	or:	
ܻ݋ݑݎ	ݎ݋ݑ݊݀	݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	ሺ݊݁݅ݐ݄݁ݎ	ܿܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁	݊݋ݎ	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎሻ	
ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁|.	
Example:	Your	own	best	outcome	is	60,	and	the	group	outcome	is	15,	then	your	round	earnings	are	
100 െ	|60 െ 15| ൌ 55	points.	
(iv)	Nobody	entered	as	a	candidate	and	you	were	randomly	selected	to	be	group	leader	
In	this	case,	your	round	earnings	are	equal	to	exactly	105	points,	or:		
ܻ݋ݑݎ	ݎ݋ݑ݊݀	݁ܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏ	ሺ݊݋ݐ	ܿܽ݊݀݅ܽݐ݁, ܾݑݐ	݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݈݁ܽ݀݁ݎሻ	
ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| ൅ 5	
ൌ 100 െ 0 ൅ 5 ൌ 105.	
	
Observe	that	if	you	are	a	candidate,	your	expected	round	payoff	is	highest	if	you	vote	for	yourself.	
This	is	because	in	case	you	will	be	elected	group	leader,	you	receive	the	leader	bonus	of	5	points	and	
avoid	any	losses	in	points	from	the	absolute	difference	between	your	best	outcome	and	the	group	
outcome,	as	your	best	outcome	will	be	the	group	outcome.	
Note	that	your	total	earnings	in	Part	1	are	equal	to	the	sum	of	all	your	round	earnings	in	that	part.	
	
Each	of	the	30	decision	rounds	in	Part	1	will	follow	the	rules	just	described.	Remember	that	you	are	
randomly	re‐matched	into	new	4‐person	groups	and	randomly	reassigned	your	own	best	outcomes	
between	each	 round.	At	 the	bottom	of	your	 computer	 screen	 there	will	be	a	 full	 summary	of	 the	
history	of	your	experience	and	payoffs	in	all	prior	rounds.	
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Decision	screens	(Party,	݊ ൌ 4,	ܿ ൌ 10	points)	
Entry	decision	
		
Voting	decision	
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Election	results	
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Decision	screens	(No	Party,	݊ ൌ 10,	ܿ ൌ 10	points)	
Entry	decision	
	
Voting	decision	
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Election	results	
		
